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THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION OF TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS TO 
ACT AS GATEKEEPERS* 
Rutheford B Campbell, Jr. ** 
Eugene R. Gaetke*** 
Recent examples of managerial misconduct at major 
corporations have called into question the adequacy of the 
gatekeeper role provided by transactional lawyers representing 
corporations. That role is governed by Model Rule 1.13(b), which 
obligates the lawyer for a corporation to take remedial action if 
the lawyer knows that corporate managers are engaged in 
actions that amount to a "violation of a legal obligation" to the 
corporation or that are unlawful and likely to result in 
substantial injury to the corporation. In addition, Model Rule 
1.2(d) forbids a lawyer from lending assistance to any action by 
corporate managers "that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent." In this article, the authors focus on the substantive 
standards within these rules that both trigger the lawyer's duty 
to take action within the corporation to protect the corporate 
client from harm and restrict the lawyer's participation in the 
corporate manager's misconduct. 
The authors conclude that, even after the American Bar 
Association's 2003 amendments to the Model Rules, the ethical 
rules making up the gatekeeper role of transactional lawyers 
provide insufficient guidance, mask various conflicts of interest, 
and offer too much latitude for lawyers to assist managerial 
misconduct. The authors propose amendments to those rules 
heightening the standards demanded of lawyers representing 
corporations. Further, as a way to address the conflict in which 
corporate lawyers find themselves-a conflict generated by the 
fact that lawyers are chosen by managers but should represent 
the interests of shareholders-the authors propose that the 
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corporation's lawyers should be chosen by the company's 
independent audit committee. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Revelations of mismanagement and fraud at Enron focused 
attention on the role transactional lawyers play as gatekeepers of 
their corporate clients' conduct. Scrutiny of lawyers' involvement in 
this tragedy is warranted. By facilitating and effectuating the 
transactions through which corporations act, lawyers are positioned 
to be suspicious of and to discourage the misconduct those 
transactions can disguise. Thus, the question is again relevant: What 
should we expect transactional lawyers representing corporations to 
do when they learn of managers' misconduct? 
That question is being asked in three legal arenas. One is the 
regulatory process. Under section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1 
enacted by Congress in response to a number of recent corporate 
outrages, the Securities and Exchange Commission was directed to 
promulgate rules pertaining to lawyers' duty to take action in 
response to managers' misconduct. Responding to this statutory 
directive, the Commission published a far-reaching and controversial 
1. Sarbanes·Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107·204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745,784. 
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proposed rule on November 21, 2002. This triggered a hurried
debate,3 as the American Bar Association4 and other lawyers' groups'
criticized the Commission's aggressiveness in and the breadth of its
proposal.' Complying with a tight congressional deadline, the
Commission then issued a more limited final rule7 but gave notice
that it would continue a more deliberative consideration of further
demands on lawyers.' The debate in the regulatory arena thus
continues.
2. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71670-01 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
3. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the SEC to promulgate its rule
within 180 days of the enactment of the Act. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307. The SEC
received 167 comments on the proposed rule between November 21, 2002, and its
issuance of the final rule on January 23, 2003. Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324-01 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). Numerous comments were received after the
Commission's issuance of the final rule as well. Id. For a list of comments received by
the SEC, see SEC, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDARDS OF
PROFESIONAL CONDUCT ON ATTORNEYS, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s74502.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).
4. For the electronic mail submission of Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President,
American Bar Association, offered in response to Securities and Exchange Commission
request for comments on proposal for Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, see Letter from ABA to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec.
18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarltonl.htm
[hereinafter ABA Letter]. The views of the ABA contained in this correspondence were
drafted by the ABA's Task Force on Implementation of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. Id. at 1-2.
5. See, e.g., Letter from Amer. Trial Lawyers to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC
(Dec. 17, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/
amercollege.htm; Letter from Karen L. Barr, General Counsel, Inv. Counsel Ass'n of
Amer. to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Jan. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/ klbarrl.htm; Letter from Kenneth Artin,
Chairman, Nat'l Ass'n of Bond Lawyers, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 18,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/kartinl.htm; Letter from
Marcia L. Proctor, Prof l Responsibility Counselors, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
SEC (Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposedls74502/
prc121602.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2003). All of these organizations filed what could
be described as negative comments in response to the SEC's proposed rule.
6. Two of the major criticisms leveled at the proposed rule by the American Bar
Association targeted the scope of the persons covered by the proposed rule and its
inclusion of a noisy withdrawal requirement. ABA Letter, supra note 4, at Part I.
7. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release No. 8185 [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 86,823,
at. 87,069 (Jan. 29, 2003).
8. Most notably, the final rule did not include the controversial "noisy
withdrawal" requirement, inviting further comment on that proposal. Press Release,
SEC, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 23, 2000),
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm. See infra text accompanying notes 68-
71 for further discussion of the SEC's proposed rule's noisy withdrawal provision.
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While much public attention is focused on the important
regulatory battlefield, the obligation of lawyers to take action in the
face of managers' misconduct is also of interest in the corporate
governance arena. A task force of the American Bar Association' has
focused on the Enron tragedy and other corporate disasters with this
subject in mind. The report of the so-called Cheek Commission"
includes changes in expectations of corporate counsel" among its
recommendations addressing the intra-corporate practices,
pressures, and structures that allowed these outrages to occur.
The third arena in which the role of lawyers in reacting to
managers' misconduct is being debated is that of professional ethics.
The American Bar Association's 1983 Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the prevalent state rules of professional ethics at the time
of the Enron incidents and currently" do expect lawyers to take
9. The American Bar Association's Task Force on Corporate Responsibility was
appointed by ABA President Robert Hirshon on March 28, 2002. American Bar
Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Report of the American Bar
Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility (Mar. 31, 2003), at
http://www.abanet.orglbuslaw/corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf [hereinafter
Cheek Commission Final Report]. Prior to its final report, the Cheek Commission also
issued a preliminary report. American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility, 58 BUS. LAW. 189 (2002) [hereinafter Cheek Commission
Preliminary Report].
10. The task force has been referred to as the Cheek Commission in honor of its
Chair, James H. Cheek, III. See, e.g., American Corporate Counsel Association,
Written Submission of the American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA) to the
ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility (The "Cheek Commission"), at
http://abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/hearings2/20021 11 1/mcguckin-testi
mony.pdf ((Nov. 11, 2002)) [hereinafter ACCA Submission].
11. The importance of the role of corporate lawyers as gatekeepers is evident in the
Cheek Commission's view of the meaning of "corporate responsibility." Cheek
Commission Final Report, supra note 9, at 4. That body notes that the term "[should
be understood] to include, at the very least, behavior by the executive officers and
directors of the corporation that conforms to law and results from the proper exercise
of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders." Id.
The Commission also notes that "our system of corporate governance has long relied
upon the active oversight and advice of the key participants in the corporate
governance process, including the directors, auditors and counsel." Id. at 12.
Furthermore, the Commission's "core conclusion" is that "the exercise by...
independent participants of active and informed stewardship of the best interests of
the corporation has in too many instances fallen short." Id. at 19-20. The Cheek
Commission also points to lawyers as among those responsible for "spectacular failures
of corporate responsibility." Id. at 18. They note that "[kinowledgeable observers have
asserted that through inaction, inattention, indifference or, in some cases, conflicting
personal interests or loyalties, some of these participants bear significant
responsibility for these failures, and lawyers have not been excluded from such
assertions." Id. at 18-19.
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983). At the time of this writing, versions
of the 1983 Model Rules have been adopted in 42 states and the District of Columbia.
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action to counter such misconduct under certain circumstances. 13 The
Enron tragedy, however, served as a dramatic warning that these
rules may be inadequate to protect corporate clients, innocent
constituents of corporations, such as employees and creditors, and
the investing public from even serious managerial abuses. As a
result, in August 2003, the ABA adopted controversial amendments
to its rules governing confidentiality and the representation of
organizations." The debates on these issues will now shift to the
states as they consider adoption of these new amendments.
While government agencies, reformers, and the public may focus
on the conduct of the lawyers at Enron and other major corporations
making the evening news, the organized bar should perceive more
widespread concerns." The questions raised by these infamous cases
differ only in degree from issues of professional responsibility
confronted regularly by transactional lawyers representing
corporations. If the current state professional rules fell short in
governing the lawyers at Enron, it is likely that they are also
inadequate when applied to the less dramatic, but cumulatively more
significant, daily work of corporate lawyers across the country. The
ABA's 2003 amendments were intended to respond to the
inadequacies of the former treatment, but it remains to be seen
whether those amendments will be up to the task.
The Enron scenario and the broader implications it raises lead
us to question in this article the sufficiency of the existing and newly
amended professional rules governing transactional lawyers who
represent corporations. In particular, we focus on the substantive
standards that trigger lawyers' duties to take remedial action in
response to managers' misconduct and that limit lawyers'
participation in that misconduct. We leave for now consideration of
the interesting questions of what those remedial actions should be,
Lawyers' Manual on Profl Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3-8 (Mar. 26, 2003) [hereinafter
Lawyers' Manual]. Three states (Illinois, New York, and Oregon) merge the Model
Rules with some provisions of the ABA's prior body of ethical rules, the MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY. Id. 01:4-7. California does not adhere to either the Model
Rules or Model Code. Id. 01:3. Four states (Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio) retain
their pre-Model Rules treatment of legal ethics. Id. 01:4-6.
13. This obligation is found in Model Rule 1.13(b), 1.13(c). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(b)-1.13(c) (1983). See discussion infra Parts II.B.2, III.B, for further
analysis of the obligation.
14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.13 (2003).
15. Professor Roger Cramton notes that "the problems we now face are systemic in
character and not merely a problem of a few executives, auditors, and lawyers who are
'bad apples.'" Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal
and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAWYER 143, 145 (2002). Using the same metaphor, he also
notes that the conduct of major law firms was implicated in the Enron scenario,
indicating that this is not merely "a 'bad apples' problem requiring greater vigilance on
the part of prosecutors or regulators." Id. at 173 n. 134.
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including whether they should include disclosures of confidential
information beyond the corporation's confines."
We conclude that those rules continue to offer transactional
lawyers for corporations insufficient guidance as to the proper focus
of their loyalty, tend to obscure troublesome conflicts of interest, and
are too lenient in permitting lawyers to assist managerial
wrongdoing. We propose ways to address these concerns. In order to
invigorate the transactional lawyer's role as gatekeeper further, we
also propose certain structural changes in corporate governance to
address present obstacles to lawyers responding to managers'
misconduct.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Lawyers as "Gatekeepers" for Corporate Conduct
Lawyers play a critical role in the actions of corporations. They
help plan, structure, negotiate, draft, and implement the
transactions through which business is done. Indeed, legal assistance
is essential to the completion of most significant transactions in the
complex, regulated world of modern corporate enterprise. Through
the rendition of legal services to corporate clients, transactional
lawyers thus serve as gatekeepers, overseeing the ultimate passage
of their clients' transactions from planning to fruition.
Allegations regarding Enron provide a sobering backdrop for
reflecting on this gatekeeper role of lawyers. 7 To the extent that
related party transactions were used by managers to hide corporate
debt, overstate the value of the company's stock, and effect
unwarranted wealth transfers, lawyers may have opened the gates
for that conduct, perhaps unwittingly, through the legal services they
provided in furtherance of those transactions. Indeed, it is doubtful
that Enron managers could have accomplished their deeds without
the assistance of lawyers in completing the transactions utilized by
16. Our reasons for so limiting our inquiry are discussed infra at notes 69-72 and
accompanying text.
17. For a press account of the Enron transactions, see Ellen Joan Pollock, Limited
Partners: Lawyers for Enron Faulted Its Deals, Didn't Force Issue, WALL ST. J., May
22, 2002, at Al; see also "The Fall of Enron: How Could It Have Happened?," Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (Jan. 24, 2002)
(statement of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego Law School),
available at http://govt-aff.senate.gov/hearings02.htm (discussing why key gatekeepers
failed to discover Enron's problems); Cramton, supra note 15, at 158-67 (discussing the
role played by lawyers for Arthur Andersen and the law firm of Vinson & Elkins,
which represented Enron in some of the questioned transactions and performed an
investigation of allegations of its wrongdoing).
[Vol. 56:1
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the managers. 8 Perhaps as much as the company's auditors, who, it
has been alleged, stretched accounting standards to legitimize the
corporation's practices through public financial reporting, lawyers
were in a position to question and attempt to discourage the
managers' misconduct before it was achieved.
The Enron episode and its aftermath also make clear the stakes
involved. A range of corporate constituencies suffered from the
misdeeds of the managers at Enron, including shareholders,
employees, and creditors. On a broader scale, the revelations of
managers' deliberate efforts to hide their company's debt and inflate
its profitability shook investors' confidence in the markets' valuation
of corporate stock generally. To the extent transactional lawyers,
acting as effective gatekeepers, can play a part in discouraging such
misconduct by managers, the societal consequences would be
substantial. Given the importance of the role transactional lawyers
play in furthering their corporate clients' conduct, increasing the
demands on lawyers as gatekeepers would accomplish more than
elevating the profession's own standards of behavior; it would also
serve to reduce the level of corporate misconduct itself.9
B. Corporate Representation and the Gatekeeper Role Under the
Model Rules
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the predominant treatment of legal ethics in this country,"0
give substance to the lawyer's gatekeeper role primarily through two
rules. The first is Model Rule 1.13, which identifies the "client" in the
representation of an organization, including corporations.2' It also
dictates action for lawyers who know of significant misconduct by a
corporate client's managers." The second rule defining a lawyer's role
18. See Cramton, supra note 15, at 144 ("[Clompliant lawyers as well as greedy
executives, lazy directors and malleable accountants are necessary for large corporate
frauds to come to life and persist long enough to cause major harm. The assistance of
inside and outside lawyers is required to structure and report on corporate
transactions.").
19. Indeed, reform of corporate lawyers' behavior may well be essential to the
success of broader corporate reforms. Id. at 144 ("Other reforms will not suffice unless
lawyers who violate legal and ethical rules are held accountable.").
20. See supra note 12 for a discussion of the dominance of the ABA's pre-2003
Model Rules in the states' regulation of lawyers' conduct.
21. This is true under the original version of Model Rule 1.13 and the 2003
amendments of the rule. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2003); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1983).
22. Under the original version of Model Rule 1.13, such actions were governed by
subpart (b). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983). Under the 2003
amendments of the rules, the actions are covered by subparts (b) and (e). MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b), 1.13(e) (2003).
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as gatekeeper is Model Rule 1.2(d), which restricts lawyers from
knowingly assisting their clients in certain wrongful conduct. 3
Together, Model Rule 1.13 and Model Rule 1.2(d) work well to
define proper conduct for lawyers in a wide array of contexts in
corporate representation. In certain problematic situations, however,
including some alleged to have occurred in the Enron scenario,24
these rules fail to offer sufficient guidance for lawyers and fall short
of defining a defensible professional role for those representing
corporations. In this section we examine the intended operation of
Model Rules 1.13 and 1.2(d), deferring discussion of the more
troubling situations until Part III.
1. The Entity Theory of the Corporate Client
Under Model Rule 1.13(a),25 an organization's lawyer is to
consider her "client" to be the organization itself." This "entity
theory" 7 of representation, requires the lawyer to conceptualize the
client by employing a fiction and to separate the interests of that
23. Concerning the gatekeeper role of lawyers, other writers have noted the
importance of Model Rule 1.6, governing the lawyer's duty to maintain the
confidentiality of information relating to the representation of a client, and Model Rule
4.1, which pertains to disclosures that may be necessary to avoid assisting in the crime
or fraud of a client. For example, the Cheek Commission's Preliminary Report focuses
on both of these rules in its discussion of lawyers' independent role in corporate
governance. See Cheek Commission Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 205-08. That
body's Final Report recommends that Model Rule 1.6 be amended to permit disclosures
to prevent a client from committing a crime or fraud that could injure the financial
interests of others if the lawyer's services have been used to further the client's
conduct or to rectify the effects of such crimes or fraud in which the lawyer's services
had been used to further that conduct. See Cheek Commission Final Report, supra note
9, at 77. Indeed, the 2003 amendments to Model Rule 1.6 adopted these
recommendations. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2), 1.6(b)(3) (2003). Our
discussion in this article, however, is limited to actions of lawyers within the
corporation and does not include actions by lawyers to make disclosures beyond the
confines of the corporate client. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
24. For a brief account of the transactions resulting in the Enron debacle, see
supra note 17.
25. The 1983 version of Model Rule 1.13(a) was not amended by the 2003 action of
the ABA. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2003) with MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1983).
26. Model Rule 1.13(a) provides that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2003).
27. The Comment to Model Rule 1.13 describes the rule's approach as being one in
which the client is the "legal entity." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 1
(2003). For an interesting discussion of the development of the entity theory of
corporate representation and its adoption in the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Model Rules, see James R. McCall, The Corporation as Client: Problems,
Perspectives, and Partial Solutions, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 623, 626-27 (1988).
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fictional being from the interests of the individual constituents 8 who
invest in, manage, finance, or do the work of the organization. Thus,
a lawyer representing a corporation, the organization of our concern
here,29 represents the corporate entity itself and does not, by virtue of
her representation of the corporation, represent any of the
constituents of the corporation such as the directors, officers,
employees, or shareholders." This distinction is abstract and difficult
for the corporation's lawyer to maintain, given that the entity must
act and speak through individuals with whom the lawyer develops
close professional and personal relationships."
Despite the difficulties in its practical application, the entity
approach provides corporate lawyers with a crucial frame of
reference for much of their work both outside and within the
corporation. Outside of the corporation, it aids the lawyer in
discriminating for himself and accurately representing to others both
the identity of the client and the reach of his authority.32 Within the
corporation, the entity theory also helps lawyers navigate tricky
professional waters. For example, the entity theory gives useful
28. The Comment to Model Rule 1.13 specifically identifies "officers, directors,
employees, [and] shareholders" as "constituents" of a corporation, while not limiting
the term to those actors. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (2003).
Modern corporate scholarship takes a broader view of the constituents relevant to a
corporation. See, e.g., Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for
the Post-Contractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 577-80 (1996) (describing
constituencies: as "money investors," which include stockholders and creditors;
"human capital investors," which include employees and managers; and "remote
constituencies," which include suppliers and the community in which the corporation
operates). For further discussion of the interests of various constituents in describing
those of most concern in this article, see infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
29. Model Rule 1.13 also governs the representation of non-corporate
organizational clients, such as partnerships, associations, and government
organizations. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmts. 1,9 (2003).
30. The same approach is adopted by the American Law Institute in the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, which provides that a lawyer
representing a corporation "represents the interests of the organization as defined by
its responsible agents acting pursuant to the organization's decision-making
procedures" and "must follow instructions ... given by persons authorized so to act on
behalf of the organization." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
96(1) (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The Comments to that provision note that
"[tihe so-called 'entity' theory of organizational representation.., is now universally
recognized in American law, for purposes of determining the identity of the direct
beneficiary of legal representation of corporations . .. ." Id. § 96 cmt. b.
31. For a discussion of complications arising from this aspect of the lawyer-
corporate client relationship, see infra Part III.A.2.a.
32. The Comments to Restatement section 96 note that "the lawyer for an
organization does not possess, solely in that capacity, power to act for officers as their
lawyer. Thus, third persons may not reasonably conclude, solely from that capacity,
that a lawyer for the organization represents officers individually." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 30, § 96 cmt. b.
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guidance to a corporation's lawyer in applying the attorney-client
privilege to communications with individuals associated with the
corporation33 and in determining to whom professional duties extend
in conducting the representation. 4
More importantly for this discussion, the entity theory also
allows corporate lawyers to address common intra-organization
issues of multiple representation. Keeping in mind that the entity is
the client, the lawyer can identify situations in which caution is
required because corporate officers or employees, for example, are
assuming that the lawyer represents their own individual interests.
Since the lawyer represents the corporate entity, he can utilize the
33. Since the corporate entity is the client, the evidentiary attorney-client privilege
applies more narrowly to communications from non-client constituents than if the
lawyer had represented the constituents individually. See RESTATEMENT § 73. This is
true even under the Supreme Court's broad view of the corporation's attorney-client
privilege. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386-87 (1981) (holding that
the attorney-client privilege protects communications from employees to counsel).
Moreover, even though statements of constituents may fall within the privilege, it is
the corporation's privilege to assert and to waive. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETICS 422 (1986). The related ethical concept of confidentiality, however, is
governed by Model Rule 1.6, which is written broadly to protect all "information
relating to representation of a client." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a)
(2003). Under this broad concept, a corporate lawyer's duty of confidentiality applies to
all constituent communications related to the representation. Even so, the Comments
to Restatement section 96 properly state that "[a] lawyer representing only an
organization does not owe duties of... confidentiality... to constituents of the
organization." RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 96 cmt. b. This reflects the entity theory
of representation. Id.
34. The entity theory provides corporate lawyers with some assurance that their
professional duty extends only to the corporation and not to the individuals they deal
with in representing it, thus limiting the lawyers' malpractice liability exposure.
Lawyers' Manual, supra note 12, at 91:2003-05. The courts have been generally
consistent in refusing to hold a corporation's lawyer liable to corporate constituents,
even when a lawyer's negligent representation of the corporation has a negative effect
on the constituents' individual interests, unless the lawyer has led the constituents to
believe that she represents them individually. Id. at 301:616-17. The drafters of the
Restatement note that "[a] lawyer representing only an organization does not owe
duties of care ... [or] diligence ... to constituents of the organization." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 30, § 96 cmt. b. This approach to corporate lawyers' duty also carries over
to their fiduciary duties. Lawyers' Manual, supra note 12, at 91:2004. Since the lawyer
represents the entity and owes it a fiduciary duty, the lawyer does not owe a fiduciary
duty to the various constituents. WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 735. This is not to say,
however, that the lawyer is absolved from liability if he or she knowingly assists the
constituents in violating their own fiduciary duties to others, such as the shareholders.
In this situation, however, the courts would be applying the concept of liability
resulting from tort and agency law rather than that of fiduciary duty of the lawyer to
the shareholders themselves. Lawyers' Manual, supra note 12, at 91:2005; see Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful
Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669, 677-82 (1981) (discussing lawyer liability for a
client's tort).
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analysis provided by the Model Rules35 to determine whether
simultaneous representation3 6 of the constituent's interests would be
permissible. 7 Model Rule 1.13(a)'s adoption of the entity theory,
however, ensures that the lawyer's first loyalty is to the corporate
entity, not to any individual constituents, in engaging in this
analysis. 8
35. That analysis is provided by Model Rule 1.7, which generally prohibits the
simultaneous representation of two clients when the representation of one would be
"directly adverse to" or "materially limited by" the representation of the other, unless
the lawyer is able to make a reasonable determination that there will be no adverse
effect on the representation and the clients consent. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003). In utilizing this analysis in the corporate situation, the lawyer
would be required to focus on the effect the representation of the constituent would
have on the representation of the corporate client and vice versa.
36. Issues of subsequent representation can also be raised in the corporate setting.
For example, a lawyer might represent a corporation in negotiating a contract with a
third party, working primarily with the corporate client's then-president. Several
years later, the corporation might sue the now former president because of conduct
related to the negotiation of the contract. The lawyer from the prior transaction might
be called upon to represent the corporation in the litigation against the former
president. If the former president objects to the lawyer's representation against her,
the question would be whether she was a former client of the lawyer. The entity theory
would require a negative conclusion, unless the lawyer had also established an
attorney-client relationship with the president at the time. Conflicts of interest arising
from instances of subsequent representation are governed by Model Rule 1.9, which
generally prohibits representations adverse to former clients in the same matter or a
matter substantially related to the prior representation, unless the former client
consents. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2003).
37. The on-going need to be mindful of such conflicts is reflected by subpart (d) of
the original version of Model Rule 1.13 and subpart (f) of the 2003 amendment of the
rule, which call upon the lawyer to clarify for a constituent the identity of the client
(that is, the entity) when it is clear that the interests of the corporation and the
constituent are adverse. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2003); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d) (1983). It is also underscored by subpart (e) of
the original version of Model Rule 1.13(e) and subpart (g) of the 2003 amendment of
the rule, which expressly acknowledge that there are situations in which a lawyer
could represent both the corporation as the entity client and the constituent as an
individual client, assuming the proper multiple representation analysis is done.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(g) (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(e) (1983). For further discussion, see supra note 35.
38. It is instructive to note that the entity theory makes the representation of a
corporation analogous to two other types of representations specially addressed in the
Model Rules. The first is one in which a lawyer is paid by one person to provide
representation for another, a situation permitted by Model Rule 1.8(f) so long as the
lawyer (1) receives informed consent from the client; (2) the lawyer maintains his
loyalty to the client and not to the third party paying for the services; and (3) the
lawyer complies with Rule 1.6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2003).
While the analogy is not perfect, both situations require the lawyer to keep in mind
who the client is and to avoid allowing any other non-client (in our corporate scenario,
the constituents of the corporation) to interfere with the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of the actual client (the corporate entity). In this sense, the entity
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The entity theory also plays a role in the lawyer's response to the
business decisions of the corporation's managers, an issue of
particular relevance here. Generally, the lawyer is expected to accept
the business decisions of the corporate client's managers, even when
those decisions strike the lawyer as unwise. 9 The lawyer must be
candid in rendering advice to the client regarding the decisions" and
is even encouraged by the Model Rules to refer to a wide range of
non-legal considerations in doing so.4 In practice, of course, corporate
managers often welcome and even seek out the lawyer's judgment
regarding the wisdom of their business decisions. Under the entity
theory, however, the lawyer is generally expected to provide
representation for the fictional corporate being, although the
constituents lawfully empowered to speak for it may make imprudent
choices.42
theory makes the corporate representation a triangular professional relationship made
up of the lawyer, the entity client, and the entity's constituents. Similar triangular
relationships arise in a number of lawyering contexts, for example, when a lawyer
represents an insured while being paid by an insurer; when a public defender
employed by a public agency represents an indigent person accused of a crime; or when
a government lawyer is required by statute to represent a private claimant in civil
litigation. For further exploration of these triangular professional relationships, see
Eugene R. Gaetke & Robert G. Schwemm, Government Lawyers and Their Private
"Clients" Under the Fair Housing Act, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 356-68 (1997).
The second situation analogous to the representation of a corporation is the
representation of a disabled client. See George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory
Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients
Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 637
(1998) ("[T]he lawyer who represents a ward owes her duties to her client, the ward,
not to the guardian, and the lawyer who represents an organization owes her duties to
the organizational entity, not to its officers or other representatives."). This situation
is governed by Model Rule 1.14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2003).
When a lawyer represents a client whose judgment is impaired due to youth or a
mental disability, the lawyer is to attempt to maintain a normal relationship with the
client. Id. The client's inability to act for herself is akin to the fictional corporate
client's similar inability. Others may try to speak for the disabled client or the
corporate client, but the lawyer must keep the identity of the client in mind in dealing
with these other, even well-intending, persons, and exercise his professional judgment
solely for the benefit of that client.
39. The drafters' comments to both the original and 2003 amended version of the
Model Rules declare that '[wihen constituents of the organization make decisions for
it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or
prudence is doubtful." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 3 (2003); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 3 (1983).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003).
41. Id. Non-legal considerations specified in Model Rule 2.1 include "moral,
economic, social and political factors." Id.
42. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the limits on a lawyer's deference to
imprudent managerial decisions under the present language of Model Rule 1.13(b)).
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To this point in our discussion, the entity theory can be seen as
providing a helpful but intuitive sense of the client in the corporate
setting. The assistance offered the lawyer by this intuition begins to
deteriorate, however, when managers' business decisions create
conflicting interests between, or even within, constituent groups. In
these situations, Model Rule 1.13(a)'s blithe reference to the client's
identity under the entity theory, as if the corporate entity can be
divorced from the interests of any and all individual persons,43 offers
little help to the corporation's lawyer who must decide how to act in
the face of these conflicts.' We will return to these difficult issues in
assessing the soundness of the present approach to the client's
identity under the entity theory in Part III.
2. Responding to Constituents' Misconduct
Both the 1983 and the 2003 versions of Model Rule 1.13(b)
prescribe the duties of a lawyer who learns that a constituent is
engaging in or is about to engage in serious misconduct related to the
corporate client. The relevance of this aspect of the rule to the Enron
scenario is apparent.
As noted above,45 the entity theory requires that a lawyer
generally defer to the business decisions of the managers who are
lawfully authorized to act and speak for the corporate client. At times
managers will make business decisions that are imprudent in the
eyes of the lawyer and yet must be furthered by her in providing
legal representation to the corporation. Some decisions or actions of
managers, however, can be so unwise and so injurious to the entity
that the lawyer must overcome her usual deference in order to fulfill
her duty to pursue the best interests of the corporate client in
providing legal services to it.46
The original and 2003 versions of Model Rule 1.13(b) capture
this concept by requiring the lawyer to take preventive action to
protect the interests of the corporate client in certain situations.
These are when the lawyer knows that a constituent of the corporate
client "is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
43. Professor Wolfram makes the point directly by stating "[a]n ultimately absurd
extension of the corporation-as-entity approach would be to argue that a corporate
lawyer indeed has no living principal in the lawyer's principal-agent relationship with
the corporation." WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 733.
44. Id. at 732 ("The answers to the question of relationship given in the lawyer
codes tend to be pat and satisfyingly high-minded but insufficient in dealing with the
complex texture of real corporate life.").
45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
46. WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 735. Professor Wolfram notes "the lawyer's duty to
act on occasion as the corporate nag, or conscience" stating that "[w]hat is good for
business and what the law requires may be very different things." Id. at 739.
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matter related to the representation," 7 when that action is "a
violation of a legal obligation to the organization,"8 or is "a violation
of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization,...
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization."49 Thus,
Model Rule 1.13(b) sets a limit on the general deference a lawyer for
a corporation may show a corporate client's managers. When
managers' actions and decisions reach beyond imprudence and attain
a level of impropriety that would cause them to violate a duty to the
corporation or would be unlawful and cause substantial harm to the
corporation, the lawyer must act.
Both the original and amended versions of Model Rule 1.13(b)
leave the precise action that must be taken, however, to the
discretion of the lawyer, with the lawyer expected to "proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.""
According to the 2003 version of Model Rule 1.13(b), however, the
lawyer must reveal the matter to "higher authority within the
organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the
highest authority that can act" on its behalf, unless the lawyer
reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the
corporation to do so." This approach creates a presumption in favor
of referral to a higher corporate authority, while leaving the lawyer
the discretion to choose not to make such a disclosure. 2 If the
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983).
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983). A constituent's legal obligation to the organization could
arise from the fiduciary duties arising out of the law of corporations, from other
sources of law, or from the policies of the corporation itself. Professor Wolfram notes
that the term "legal obligation" encompasses "all kinds of legal duties, whether they
arise from criminal law, statutory law, administrative regulations, or any other legal
source." WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 744.
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983). For a discussion of the meaning of "violation of law," see
infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text. It is generally asserted that the clause
requiring the likelihood of substantial harm modifies only the "violation of law"
situation and not the prior "violation of a legal obligation to the organization"
situation. Lawyers' Manual, supra note 12, at 91:2406. Thus, any proposed or actual
violation of a legal obligation to the corporation would warrant preventive action by
the lawyer.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983).
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003).
52. That the "up-the-ladder" reporting step was viewed as critical to the ABA is
shown by its adoption of Model Rule 1.13(e) among its 2003 amendments. That
provision requires a lawyer who is discharged for taking action under Model Rule
1.13(b) or (c) or who withdraws in circumstances calling for or allowing action under
those sections "shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure
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responsive actions by the lawyer under Model Rule 1.13(b) fail to
arrest the troublesome action, the 2003 amended version of Model
Rule 1.13(c) declares that if the individual constituent's action is
"clearly a violation of the law... reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the organization" the lawyer may disclose
confidential information if she reasonably believes it is necessary to
prevent that injury.53 Thus, the newly amended rule permits, but
does not require, lawyers to reveal information outside of the
organization in sufficiently serious situations. 4
The duty to take preventive action imposed by both the original
and 2003 versions of Model Rule 1.13(b) can be seen as an extension
of the entity theory embraced in subsection (a) of that rule. If the
client is to be the entity rather than the constituents of the
corporation, it was important for the drafters of the rules to
anticipate that constituent misconduct harmful to the entity might
come to the attention of the lawyer. In that situation, the lawyer's
loyalty to the entity client logically mandates some action to protect
it from the harm occurring through or threatened by the
constituent's actions.5 This idea is captured by the requirement that
that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or
withdrawal." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(e) (2003).
Under the prior version of Model Rule 1.13(b), still in force in the vast majority of
states, lawyers had even more discretion in reacting to constituent misconduct. The
rule provided that in determining how to proceed in the best interest of the
organization, the lawyer "shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the
violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation,
the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person
involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and any other
relevant considerations." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983).
Furthermore, the rule required the lawyer to take action "designed to minimize
disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the
representation to persons outside the organization." Id. Beyond that, the rule listed
several possible and likely sequential responses by the lawyer, including asking that
the actor reconsider the proposed action, suggesting that another legal opinion be
obtained on the action, and referring the matter to a higher, even the highest,
authority within the organization for review. Id.
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c)(1)-1.13(c)(2) (2003).
54. The prior version of Model Rule 1.13(c) permitted the lawyer only to withdraw
if his efforts within the organization failed to arrest the misconduct. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (1983). This approach to responding to corporate
wrongdoing has been summarized by one commentator as telling lawyers, "Your
responsibility to a corporate client who is being gravely wronged is to be silent and
walk away." Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the
Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 304 (1987).
55. The Cheek Commission recognized the relationship between the entity theory
and the duty to take remedial action in response to managers' misconduct that is
reflected in Model Rule 1.13 by noting that the "premise of Rule 1.13 is that the
organization is the lawyer's client and that the lawyer owes that client an obligation of
protection from harm." Cheek Commission Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 203.
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the lawyer respond in the "best interest of the organization"56 in such
circumstances. 7
The "whistle-blowing" aspect of Model Rule 1.13 has been
controversial since the ABA's 1983 adoption of the Model Rules.58 At
that time, a number of commentators questioned that organization's
omission of a duty for lawyers to reveal more publicly even the most
flagrant constituent misconduct, as the Kutak Commission had
urged in its proposed version of the Model Rules. 9 Indeed, a number
of states ultimately embraced the earlier position of the Kutak
proposal in their final adoption of the Model Rules." Even before the
news of the Enron tragedy surfaced, thoughtful scholars urged a
reconsideration of the tepid approach to constituent wrongdoing
contained in Model Rule 1.13.1 The ABA's amendment of that rule is
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983).
57. The Restatement takes a similar approach to the problem of constituent
misconduct in lawyers' representation of corporations, although it imposes an
obligation that is broader in two respects than that imposed by both the original and
amended versions of Model Rules 1.13(b) and 1.13(c). RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, §
96(2)-(3). The Restatement does not require that the misconduct at issue be related to
the representation as does Model Rule 1.13(b). Compare id. with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983) and MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b)
(2003). Further, the Restatement's obligation applies to past action by a constituent,
not just ongoing or proposed action. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 96.
58. Harris, supra note 38, at 604-06; see STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON,
REGULATION OF LAWYER: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 146-52 (1999) (tracing the
development of the approach eventually adopted in Model Rules 1.13(b) and (c), as well
as noting examples of various state versions of the provisions).
59. See WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 61-62
60. Lawyers' Manual, supra note 12, at 91:2402-03.
61. Gillers, supra note 54, at 143-45; Harris, supra note 38, at 637-38; McCall,
supra note 27, at 639-40. Professor Richard Painter and Jennifer Duggan argued that
such a result should be imposed through federal legislation. See Richard W. Painter &
Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm
Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225 (1996). Professor Painter later made the same
assertion to the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission in its consideration of proposed
amendments to the Model Rules. See Cramton, supra note 15, at 179 n.147. Despite
these opinions, the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission, however, recommended no
changes to Model Rule 1.13(b) in its proposals for needed amendments to the Model
Rules. See id. After the Enron news surfaced, along with approximately 40 law
professors, Professor Painter urged the SEC to adopt a more meaningful whistle-
blowing role for lawyers in its new regulation of securities lawyers. Id.; see also Letter
from Susan P. Koniak et al. to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 17, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/spkoniakl.htm. The ABA's
comment to the SEC's proposed rule curiously then asked the Commission to postpone
adopting its new rule to give it time to consider possible amendments to Model Rule
1.13(b) and (c), something it's Ethics 2000 Commission had declined to do only a short
time earlier. ABA Comment, supra note 4, at Parts III, V.C.
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thus likely to rekindle the controversy as the state supreme courts
consider the issue yet again.
The debate regarding a lawyer's appropriate response to
managers' misconduct has been expanded further by the SEC's
promulgation of its new regulation of lawyer conduct as directed by
Congress in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. That
statute required the SEC to issue rules requiring lawyers 2 to report
evidence of managers' misconduct63 to the company's chief legal
counsel or its chief executive officer and, if that reporting should fail
to result in an appropriate response, to go "up-the-ladder" 4 to the
corporation's audit committee, another committee of independent
directors, or the board of directors itself.5 Congress thus envisioned a
regulation mandating remedial action by lawyers much like that only
conditionally demanded in Model Rule 1.13(b).66 The final rule issued
by the SEC accomplishes the congressional goal, exceeding even the
2003 amended version of Model Rule 1.13(b)'s requirements in
several respects. 7 The further issue of what lawyers must do in the
event that their disclosures within the corporation fail to arrest the
misconduct will be debated further as the SEC gives further
consideration to its so-called "noisy withdrawal" provision.68
62. According to the statute, the new rule was to apply to lawyers "appearing and
practicing before the Commission in any way." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (2002).
63. The misconduct referred to in Section 307 includes "a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation." Id.
64. The phrase is used by the SEC in Part III of its release pertaining to the
proposed rule. ABA Comment, supra note 4, at Part III.
65. § 307, 116 Stat. at 745.
66. That is, Model Rule 1.13(b) requires action by the lawyer in the face of known
managerial misconduct, and the rule requires the lawyer to report that misconduct to
higher authorities within the corporation, but the rule excuses this reporting up if "the
lawyer reasonably believes that is not necessary in the best interest" of the corporation
to do so. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.13(b) (2003). Thus, reporting up is not
mandatory in all instances under the 2003 amendment to Model Rule 1.13 as it is in
the SEC regulation. For further discussion of this aspect of Model Rule 1.13(b), see
supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
67. For purposes of this discussion, most notable is the fact that the level of
certainty the lawyer must have to trigger the obligation to take remedial action is
lower under the SEC rule than under Model Rule 1.13(b). See SEC, PROPOSED RULE:
IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS 17 CFR
205, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm (last modified Dec.
17, 2002) [hereinafter PROPOSED RULE: 17 CFR § 205]. For a further discussion of this
aspect of the SEC's final rule compared to Model Rule 1.13(b), see infra text
accompanying notes 147-64.
68. PROPOSED RULE: 17 CFR § 205, supra note 67, § IC(A). The SEC's proposed rule
mandated that in situations involving ongoing or pending misconduct that will "likely
result in substantial injury" to the corporation or its investors, outside legal counsel
"withdraw from the representation" of the corporation, notify the SEC of the
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1
The outcome of the noisy withdrawal issue in the regulatory
context is important to lawyers subject to the SEC rule, 69 their
corporate clients, and the public. In this article, however, we have
chosen to focus on the point at which all lawyers must take action
within the confmes of their client corporations when managers
engage in misconduct. Our primary concern is with the standards
that determine when a lawyer must act to protect her corporate
client from managers' misconduct, and we give less attention to the
particular remedial actions, including making a noisy withdrawal,
that the lawyer must take. We believe that the standards that
determine the lawyer's duty to take action and that restrict a
lawyer's assistance to a client's misconduct have the most profound
impact on the effectiveness of lawyers as gatekeepers. This belief is
based on our impression that in the vast majority of instances clients
will not pursue a transaction if their lawyers say, "This transaction is
inconsistent with our professional ethics and we cannot participate."
We believe that corporate boards of directors are generally
inclined to respond appropriately to lawyers' allegations of
wrongdoing when made.7 ° In the post-Enron world, corporate
withdrawal, and "disaffirm any submission to the [SEC] that [the lawyer has]
participated in preparing which is tinted by the violation." Id. § IV(B). The
Commission's rule as promulgated did not contain these provisions, but the agency
announced that it will continue to consider their adoption at a later time. See Press
Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 23,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm.
69. The rule is broad, purporting to reach lawyers "appearing and practicing before
the Commission," which means:
(i) Transacting any business with the Commission, including
communications in any form;
(ii) Representing an issuer in a Commission administrative proceeding or in
connection with any Commission investigation, inquiry, information request,
or subpoena;
(iii) Providing advice in respect of the United States securities laws or the
Commission's rules or regulations thereunder regarding any document that
the attorney has notice will be filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into
any document that will be filed with or submitted to, the Commission,
including the provision of such advice in the context of preparing, or
participating in the preparation of, any such document; or
(iv) Advising an issuer as to whether information or a statement, opinion, or
other writing is required under the United States securities laws or the
Commission's rules or regulations thereunder to be filed with or submitted
to, or incorporated into any document that will be filed with or submitted to,
the Commission ....
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a) (2003); see also SEC, FINAL RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATrORNEYS, available at
httpJ/www.sec.gov/rules/fmal/33-8185.htm (last modified Jan. 21, 2003) (discussing
the implementation of 17 C.F.R. § 205).
70. In its response to the Cheek Commission's Preliminary Report, the American
Corporate Counsel Association notes that "[iun the vast majority of cases, the mere
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directors should be increasingly conscious of the potential for their
company's and their own misconduct, liability, and criminality. In
the present milieu, it is doubtful whether all of the members of a
board of directors, particularly the outside directors, would
themselves choose to remain silent in the face of a lawyer's
disclosures regarding managerial misconduct even if the board voted
to do nothing in reaction.7' Therefore, we believe the more pressing
concern is to focus on the standards that trigger the lawyer's duty to
take remedial action within the corporation" and to refrain from
assisting managers' misconduct.
prospect that the lawyer may go to the board is enough to get even the most
recalcitrant managers to reform their thinking." ACCA Submission, supra note 10, at
4.
71. In its response to the SEC's proposed rule, the ABA notes that "it is important
to recognize that a sea change has taken place in corporate governance since the
failures that contributed to the corporate scandals." ABA Comment, supra note 4, at
Part VI.C.
72. In this article, therefore, we do not address the interesting issue of disclosure
of confidential information beyond the corporate confines when necessary to address
client fraud. This issue is intertwined with the broader and still controversial
treatment of confidentiality under the Model Rules. Those rules, as adopted by the
ABA in 1983, have provided lawyers only limited grounds for disclosure of confidential
information. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1983) (permissive
disclosure of information relating to representation allowed when necessary to prevent
a client from committing a crime "likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm" or for the lawyer to be able to defend himself or establish a claim in a
dispute with a client or to respond to allegations about the lawyer's representation).
The proper reach of confidentiality, particularly the matter of disclosure when client
fraud may have or has occurred, were among the most controversial provisions of the
Model Rules as evidenced by the wide variety of state approaches to confidentiality,
most rejecting the ABA's provisions. For example, currently forty-one states have
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality to prevent a client from committing criminal
fraud, a disclosure not permitted by the ABA's 1983 version of Model Rule 1.6. Cheek
Commission Final Report, supra note 9, at 49. Recently, renewed efforts to restrict the
protection of confidentiality in the Ethics 2000 process resulted in only modest
amendment of Model Rule 1.6. That group recommended the addition of three
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, but the ABA House of Delegates approved
only one, rejecting two that pertained to preventing or rectifying fraud. A.B.A.
COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 42 (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-whole-rpt.doc. The Cheek Commission recommended
adoption of these two proposed exceptions among its recommendations for improving
lawyers' role in corporate governance. Cheek Commission Preliminary Report, supra
note 9, at 205-07. In August 2003, the ABA House of Delegates approved an
amendment to Model Rule 1.6 incorporating these two exceptions permitting
disclosures of confidential information pertaining to client crimes or fraud in which the
client has used the lawyer's services. See Lawyers' Manual, supra note 12, 19 Current
Reports 467-69 (Aug. 13, 2003) (description of ABA House of Delegates action on Model
Rule 1.6). The ABA also amended Model Rule 1.13(c) by including a permissive
disclosure provision when a lawyer's remedial actions within the corporation have
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If the rules of legal ethics would demand that lawyers provide
better representation within the confines of their corporate clients,
the interests of shareholders, employees, creditors, and the public
will be better protected as well, even without expecting lawyers to
reveal managerial wrongdoing beyond the corporation itself. In this
regard, the standards by which the profession measures the lawyers'
duty to react within the corporation to actual or pending managerial
misconduct seem troubling, a subject to which we will return in Part
III.
3. The Outer Limit on Advocacy and Advice
Lawyers for corporations, like other lawyers, must be mindful of
another limit on their duty to pursue their clients' interests. While
all lawyers are expected to represent their clients competently,
zealously, and loyally, Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from
counseling or assisting a client "in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent."' This rule provides the outer limit on the
lawyer's discretion to act in pursuit of a client's interests.74 For
corporate lawyers, this limit also serves as part of their gatekeeper
duties.
The restriction on lawyers' conduct presented by Model Rule
1.2(d) can be viewed as a public interest obligation of lawyers to act
to protect society by refusing to assist, and thereby discouraging,
their clients' misconduct. The obligation also can be viewed as
something less noble,"5 merely exhorting lawyers to avoid being
participants in their clients' crimes" or fraud." Regardless of one's
failed to arrest managers' misconduct and substantial injury to the corporation is
reasonably certain. Id.
73. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003). No change was made in the
1983 version of Model Rule 1.2(d) by the 2003 amendments.
74. Lawyers have the discretion to refuse to assist clients in questionable
activities. For example, lawyers may withdraw from representing a client who "insists
upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has
a fundamental disagreement." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2003).
Even if a lawyer doesn't "know" that a client is engaged in a crime or fraud, she may
withdraw if she "reasonably believes" this is so. Id. R. 1.16(b)(2). Model Rule 1.2(d),
however, defines the point at which a lawyer must refuse to assist a client's wrongful
conduct.
75. One of the co-authors of this article so views Model Rule 1.2(d). See Eugene R.
Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 65-68 n.140 (1989) (The
obligation to avoid assisting clients in criminal conduct and fraud under Model Rule
1.2(d) is "coextensive with legal duties of persons other than lawyers.").
76. Professor Wolfram notes that lawyers enjoy no immunity from the criminal
law, even while engaged in performing an "otherwise traditional lawyerly function,
such as advice-giving or legal drafting." WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 693 (citations
omitted). Thus, he concludes that a "lawyer's conduct that facilitates a client's
commission of a crime comes comfortably within the definitions of accomplice.. . ." Id.
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glass-half-full or half-empty perspective, however, the provision does
draw an important line beyond which lawyers may not go in
providing representation to their clients.
For the corporate lawyer, Model Rule 1.2(d) works in tandem
with Model Rule 1.13. The lawyer represents the corporate entity
under Model Rule 1.13(a) rather than any of the constituents making
up the corporation. When any of those constituents act or propose to
act in violation of their duties to the corporation or unlawfully in
such a way as to harm the corporation, under Model Rule 1.13(b), the
lawyer must take remedial action to protect the best interests of the
corporate client. Should those remedial actions fail to stop the
misconduct, the lawyer is free, but is not required, to withdraw from
the representation under Model Rule 1.16, thus ending participation
in the constituent's and the corporation's misconduct. In sufficiently
serious situations, the 2003 amended version of Model Rule 1.13(c)
also permits the lawyer to reveal confidential information to prevent
substantial injury to the corporation."8
For the lawyer concerned about a constituent's actions, who
concludes that remedial action is not warranted or who chooses not
to withdraw when his remedial actions have failed to arrest the
misconduct, Model Rule 1.2(d) stands as the outer limit on the
lawyer's appropriate participation in the client's wrongdoing. If the
lawyer knows that the client's course of action is a crime or fraud, the
lawyer may not assist the client in the conduct. For lawyers
representing corporations, this generally would mean that the lawyer
would be unable to provide legal assistance in transactions that the
lawyer knows will further the client's criminal or fraudulent
conduct."
77. See Hazard, supra note 34, at 677-82 (discussing the sources of a lawyer's
liability for a client's torts).
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2003).
79. In some situations, it could be said that Model Rule 4.1 would require the
lawyer to take the additional step of making disclosures to third parties in order to
avoid assisting the client's crime or fraud. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
4.1 (2003) (discussing disclosures to third parties). As adopted by the ABA in 1983,
however, the effectiveness of that rule's obligation is questionable because of the
exception it provides for disclosures prohibited by Model Rule 1.6. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (1983). In Professor Wolfram's opinion, that exception
results in "the apparent utter irrelevance of Rule 4.1(b)." WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at
672. This results from the failure of the ABA to include within the exceptions to the
confidentiality provisions of Model Rule 1.6 permission to disclose confidential
information when required by other law. Id. As a result of the Ethics 2000 review of
the Model Rules, Professor Wolfram's concern has been addressed by adding the 2002
revision adding the exception to Model Rule 1.6(b). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(b)(6) (2003). Thus, under the ABA's current version of Model Rules 1.6 and 4.1,
a lawyer may be required to make disclosures necessary to avoid assisting a client's
criminal or fraudulent conduct, although most states have yet to adopt this change.
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Model Rule 1.2(d) may provide a useful limit on lawyers
assisting their clients in crimes or defrauding others."0 The question
remains, however, whether it provides sufficient protection to
corporate clients and society against the sort of managerial
misconduct that a corporation's transactional lawyer might confront,
a question we will address in Section III.
While strengthened by the ABA'S 2003 amendments, the
treatment of the lawyer's gatekeeper role by the Model Rules could
still be best described as restrained. Under these rules, in
representing their corporate clients lawyers are required to react to
situations involving clear misconduct by managers but only by
raising concerns and seeking reconsideration within the corporation
itself. In addition, in all situations, corporate lawyers are to refrain
from knowingly assisting their clients in engaging in crimes or fraud.
Given the backdrop of the Enron scenario, we now examine whether
more should be expected of transactional lawyers in their role as
gatekeepers.
III. ASSESSING THE PRESENT APPROACH
The present rules of professional ethics resolve a range of issues
arising in the ordinary course of lawyers' representation of corporate
clients. They do not, however, articulate a suitable gatekeeper role
for those lawyers, especially in circumstances when managerial
conduct approaches impropriety. In part, this is because of the
shortcomings of the entity theory in addressing the conflicts that
complicate corporate representation. In addition, the expectations for
lawyers who do face managerial misconduct are simply too low.
A. The Failure of the Entity Theory
The entity theory is appealing for its very simplicity, but it fails
to account for the complex mix of interests among corporate
constituencies. Much of this failure can be corrected by better
merging the entity theory with corporate fiduciary principles that
obligate corporate managers to pursue the best interests of
shareholders. Even with this shift in perspective, however, other
persistent conflicts will remain unaddressed by the entity theory.
These include structural conflicts arising from the natural alliance
between lawyers and the corporate managers who hire them and the
conflicts that arise within the ranks of the shareholders themselves.
Elevating the gatekeeper role of transactional lawyers will thus
Because this article is limited to the subject of the lawyer's duty to act within the
corporation in response to managers' misconduct, a detailed discussion of the
obligation to disclose to third parties under Model Rules 4.1 is not offered.
80. Id. R. 1.2(d).
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require both an elaboration of the entity theory and recognition of its
limits.
1. The Duty to Pursue the Best Interests of Shareholders
The rules of professional conduct demand that all lawyers act in
the best interests of their clients.81 As defined by the entity theory,
this obligation means that transactional lawyers representing
corporations must pursue the best interests of the corporate entity as
a whole.82  Interpreting and fulfilling this obligation to the
corporation, however, are often difficult tasks for the lawyer due in
large measure to the conflicting interests among the various parties
that have investments in the corporation and are thus impacted by
the outcomes of corporate transactions.83
Modern corporate scholarship has parsed the corporate entity4
and identified a number of constituencies that have interests in the
81. The Model Rules direct lawyers to act with competence, Model Rule 1.1, and
diligence, Model Rule 1.3, on behalf of a client. Those rules require lawyers to "act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003). The
Restatement states that "a lawyer must, in matters within the scope of the
representation... proceed in a manner reasonably calculated to advance the client's
lawful objectives .... RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 16. Comment c to that provision
states that a "lawyer's efforts in representation must be for the benefit of the
client. .. ."Id. cmt. c.
82. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
83. Professor Gillers notes that "[t]he triangular relationship between a corporate
lawyer, the client's agents and the client itself accounts for many of the ethical
complications in corporate representation." Gillers, supra note 54, at 294.
84. Reference to a body of scholarship generally referred to as the nexus of contract
theory may be helpful. Although he questions the worth of the concept, Professor
Eisenberg defines the concept to mean "that the corporation is a nexus of reciprocal
arrangements." Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus
of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822 (1999). Thus, for
example, under the nexus of contracts theory, common shareholders, when they
contribute capital, make arrangements with managers, preferred shareholders,
creditors, and workers to have voting control over the business and to get everything
that is left for distribution after the employees have been paid their wages and senior
investors have been paid their interest and preferred dividends. Managers arrange to
accept capital from investors and to run the company in an honest and efficient
manner. Workers arrange to work for wages that will be paid subject to arrangements
they have with other constituencies such as common stockholders. The "nexus" for all
of these parties and their arrangements is the corporation.
This simple description of the nexus of contract approach to a corporation may help
illuminate the different groups that have an interest in a corporation and its success.
It may also help illuminate the point that the groups may in some cases have interests
that are parallel to one another while in other instances the interests of the groups
may be different.
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corporation and its success.85 While some attention has been given to
more remote constituencies,86 legal and economic literature has
focused primarily on shareholders, creditors, employees and
managers. 7
In many corporate transactions, these four constituencies have
interests that are parallel, as when the company reduces its
operating expenses by replacing an important but aging machine
with one that is more efficient. All four of the noted constituencies
have an interest in the transaction, and all benefit from the
reduction in operating expenses that flow from the acquisition of the
new machine.88 In such transactions-where a proposed corporate
transaction affects all constituencies similarly-the entity theory
Professor Eisenberg credits Michael Jensen and William Meckling with the first
formulation of the concept, although Eisenberg ultimately traces the concept to Ronald
Coase. Id. at 819-21.
85. See, e.g., Campbell, Corporate Fiduciary Principles, supra note 28, at 577-80
(describing constituencies as "money investors," which include stockholders and
creditors; "human capital investors," which include employees and managers; and
"remote constituencies," which include suppliers and the community in which the
corporation operates).
86. See id. at 586-88.
87. Much of the literature has dealt with what, if any, obligation corporate
managers may owe to creditors and employees of the corporation. For a discussion of
the applicability of fiduciary duty protection for corporate creditors, see, e.g, Albert H.
Barkey, The Financial Articulation of a Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders with Fiduciary
Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 47, 67-72 (1986);
William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 106-13; Rutheford B Campbell, Limited Liability for
Corporate Shareholders: Myth or Matter-of-Fact, 63 KY. L.J. 23, 55-71 (1975); Thomas
R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The Corporation, the Bondholder and Fiduciary.
Duties, 10 J. L. & COMM. 187 (1991); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate
Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413 (1986); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205 (1988); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of
Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1990).
For a discussion of the applicability of fiduciary duty protection for corporate
employees, see, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of
Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1189 (1991); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders under State
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 48-53 (1991); Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, Policing Employment Contracts Within the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm,
43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353, 363-69 (1993). For a different view of employees and their
need for fiduciary protection, see Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will,
51 U. Cm. L. REV. 947, 953-55 (1984).
88. Perhaps one imagines that shareholders will benefit most here, but the
increased strength of the going concern and its profit generating prospects resulting
from the increased efficiency will help creditors, making it more likely that the
company can repay its debt, and its managers and employees, whose future salaries
become more secure.
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continues to be functional. The lawyer is able to define his
professional responsibility by considering the entity as a whole.
Other corporate transactions, however, affect the various
constituencies differently and at times put their interests in conflict.
In these transactions - where one constituency gains at the expense
of another - it remains imperative that the lawyer act in the best
interests of the client. An attempt to define the identity of the client
solely by reference to the interests of the corporate entity as a whole,
however, is not helpful in such circumstances.89
Consider, for example, the following situation, based loosely on
some of the reported problems at Enron." Assume that a lawyer
representing Alpha Co. is requested by senior officers to provide the
legal work for Alpha to form and launch a special purpose entity. The
senior officers of Alpha will personally invest in and manage the
entity and, as a result, reap immense and unwarranted profits. 1
Assume further that the lawyer knows the arrangement will put the
interests of one constituency, the senior officers, in a conflicted
position with the interests of Alpha's shareholders and other
important constituencies" and will violate the corporation's own
conflict of interest policy.
While we may intuit that the lawyer for the corporation should
not lend assistance to this transaction, the entity theory by itself, at
least if literally applied, does little to define the permissible limits of
the lawyer's conduct. This is because one important part of the
corporation, the managers, will benefit from the transaction, while
another important constituency, the shareholders, will be hurt as a
result of the excessive management fees and investment returns
extracted by the management group. It is impossible, therefore, to
define the lawyer's obligations in this case solely by reference to the
entity as a whole.
89. See, e.g., Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., A Positive Analysis of the Common Law of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 84 KY. L.J. 455, 460-69 (1996) (describing, with the
assistance of graphs, the way in which various corporate transactions impact the
corporate constituencies).
90. For a brief description of the relevant Enron transactions, see supra notes 17-
19 and accompanying text.
91. Reports indicate that a senior manager at Enron received "$40-plus million...
from his partnerships... that had lucrative deals with Enron." Kathryn Kranhold &
Mitchell Pacelle, Enron Paid Top Managers $681Million, Even as Stock Slid, WALL ST.
J., June 17, 2002, at B1.
92. Obviously, the conflict is due to the fact that the senior officers gain personally
from these transactions by diverting as much corporate wealth to themselves as
possible. Shareholders, employees and creditors, on the other hand, lose as a result of
those acts, since the diversion of assets to senior officers leaves less corporate wealth
available to satisfy the claims of the other constituencies.
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Consider now a more difficult transaction with varying impacts
on other corporate constituencies. Assume that Target Co. is hit with
an unsolicited takeover bid from Aggressor One to acquire all the
outstanding common stock of Target in a highly leveraged
transaction at a price of two times the present market value of
Target's common stock. Assume for now that Target has debentures
but no preferred stock outstanding. A successful acquisition of Target
by Aggressor One in this case, let us assume, will be in the best
interests of Target's shareholders, who will receive a substantial
premium for their shares. On the other hand, we assume here that
the acquisition will be detrimental to Target's debenture holders and
employees, since the additional leverage will depress the market
value of the debentures, and many employees will lose their jobs as a
result of the consolidation of the two companies."
If Target's managers enlist the assistance of the corporation's
lawyer to facilitate the acquisition, a literal application of the entity
theory once again fails to define the lawyer's professional duties in
the situation. The lawyer's attempt to determine whether he is able
to lend assistance to the transaction, as requested by corporate
management, or instead must take remedial steps, cannot be
determined solely by reference to the interests of the entity as a
whole. This is because the acquisition will harm two of the corporate
constituencies--creditors and employees-but will benefit one
constituency-shareholders.
Consider now a variation of these facts. Assume that Aggressor
Two emerges as a second bidder for Target and that the managers of
Target demonstrably have determined to sell Target. Aggressor Two
offers a per share bid for Target that is only one-half of Aggressor
One's bid, but the acquisition by Aggressor Two will fully protect and
perhaps enhance the interests of Target's debenture holders and
workers. Aggressor Two, assume, is a very strong company that will
add no leverage in the acquisition and fire no workers but instead
will increase workers' salaries as it blends Target's workforce into its
own.
94
Management actions facilitating the acquisition by Aggressor
Two, of course, will lead to an outcome that reverses the impacts on
the constituencies in the preceding example, since the acquisition by
Aggressor Two benefits debenture holders and workers but harms
shareholders. Therefore, a lawyer asked by Target managers to lend
93. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 89, at 460-69 (offering a graphic representation
of the impact of such transactions on the constituencies).
94. The example is based on the facts of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del. 1985), in which the board of Revlon attempted
to justify its preference for a particular favored bidder by reference to the promise of
that bidder to support the value of the company's debt instruments.
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assistance to that transaction is once again unable to define his
professional obligations by reference to the entity as a whole.
The Model Rules, however, provide assistance with these
problems by referring to the law of corporations, which offers a
helpful and sensible gloss for the entity theory. The gloss dictates
that in transactions involving conflicts among corporate
constituencies or possible managerial misconduct, the "entity" or the
"client" for the corporate lawyer must be identified by reference to
the interests of the corporation's shareholders.
Specifically, both the 1983 and the 2003 versions of Model Rule
1.13(b) require that the lawyer for a corporation take remedial action
if, in connection with the lawyer's representation, an "officer,
employee or other person associated with the organization" engages
in a transaction "that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization."5 For our purposes, the relevant "legal obligation" is
the fiduciary duty owed by corporate managers to their corporation.
In the corporate legal literature, much has been written about
the nature and the appropriate beneficiaries of managers' fiduciary
obligation to the corporation.96 The core of this duty, however, is the
obligation of corporate managers to act in the best interests of the
company's shareholders.97 Normally, this means that corporate
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003).
96. For a brief summary of that literature, see supra note 87.
97. As a positive matter-what the law is today-f we come down firmly on the
side of measuring managers' obligations by reference to the best interests of
shareholders. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to offer extensive support for
our position on this matter, the following distinguished commentators reach or assume
similar conclusions: Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001) ("The triumph of the shareholder-oriented
model of the corporation over its principal competitors is now assured .... [That
model has] duties to serve the interests of shareholders alone .... [Tihe standard
model of shareholder primacy has always been the dominant legal model in the ... the
U.S....."); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from
Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2031 (1993) (recognizing that U.S.
corporation law seeks "to maximize shareholder welfare."); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate (2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNID299727-code020217630.pdf?abstract
id=299727 (last visited Mar. 24, 2003) ("Despite occasional academic arguments to the
contrary, the shareholder wealth maximization norm... indisputably is the law of the
United States."). For a contrary view on the positive law, see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and
Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1203 (2002)
("The courts have chosen between the property and the entity models of the public
firm, and they have opted for the latter.").
As a normative matter, however, one of the authors is on record as favoring an
expanded view of fiduciary duties, which would require corporate managers to act in a
manner consistent with fiduciary duties owed to other constituencies. See Campbell,
supra note 28, at 599-615 (arguing in favor of fiduciary duties running in favor of
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managers are obligated to act in ways that maximize the wealth of
corporate shareholders. 8
Under the original and amended Model Rule 1.13(b), the ethical
obligation of the lawyer for the corporation is derivative of this
fiduciary obligation of the corporation's managers under substantive
corporate law to act in the best interests of the corporation's
shareholders. The Rule, therefore, as informed by the law of
corporations, obligates lawyers to take remedial action if the
corporate manager proposes a course of conduct that the lawyer
knows is not in the best interests of shareholders.9
Using this analysis, the lawyer for the corporation in the first of
our three above examples may be obliged to take remedial action in
response to the senior officers' proposal to set up a special purpose
entity through which they would receive unwarranted benefits from
the corporation.'00 This conclusion is based on our assumption that
these transactions transfer an unwarranted amount of corporate
wealth to the senior officers and, thus, would violate the senior
officers' fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of shareholders.
corporate creditors and employees); Campbell, supra note 87, 55-71 (arguing in favor
of fiduciary duties for creditors of corporations).
98. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.").
Although under today's laws, the obligations of corporate managers are generally
judged against the best interests of shareholders and the maximization of shareholder
wealth, certain carve-outs from this principle exist. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 2.01, 6.02(b)(2) (1994). Perhaps these carve-outs are best
demonstrated by the right managers have to make reasonable contributions to
charities even if such gifts are unconnected to maximization of shareholder wealth.
See, e.g., id. § 2.01(b) (authorizing gifts of a "reasonable amount of resources to public
welfare.., and philanthropic purposes", even though "corporate profit and
shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced"). Illustrations 19 and 20 to Section 2.01
also provide examples in which a manager makes transfer payments to employees who
are to be discharged as a result of a shift in the business fortunes of the corporation.
Id. § 2.01 illus. 19-20. Such transfer payments to employees are legally permissible as
"humanitarian" even though not tied to the wealth maximization of shareholders. Id.
The Illustrations make clear, however, that this humanitarian carve-out for employees
must be reasonable and thus should not be considered as a rejection of the principle of
the general obligation of managers to act in the best interests of shareholders. Id.
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983).
100. This example is very close to an Illustration provided in the Restatement in
which the president of a corporate client enlists the assistance of the company's lawyer
in making an unwarranted corporate gift to the president's friend. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 30, § 96 cmt. e, illus. 1. Based on the assumption that the lawyer in the
case "concludes that such a gift would cause financial harm to" the corporation, the
Illustration states that the "[1]awyer may not draft the documents" necessary to
facilitate the gift. Id.
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The Model Rules also indicate that in the second example-the
proposal to facilitate a highly leveraged acquisition-the lawyer
would not be obliged to take remedial action. That transaction,
although detrimental to both corporate employees and creditors,
benefits shareholders and thus is consistent with today's corporate
fiduciary duties. 0'
The third example-the proposal to facilitate the acceptance of a
significantly inferior bid for the company's common stock-may
obligate the lawyer for the corporation to take remedial steps.0 2 This
is because, under our assumptions, accepting the significantly
inferior bid would be harmful to shareholders, although benefiting
creditors and employees, and thus might amount to a breach of the
obligation of managers to act in the best interests of shareholders.'
These three examples demonstrate the benefit of the gloss
provided by the law of corporations in applying the entity theory
101. See Campbell, supra note 89, at 502 (managers "not only ... were permitted to
engage in the wealth-transferring transaction [from creditors to stockholders], but
also ... were required to do so"). The article goes on to point out, however, that "courts
had more trouble here." Id. at 503.
102. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1985), the board of Revlon attempted to justify its preference for a particular favored
bidder by reference to the promise of that bidder to support the value of the company's
debt instruments. Id. at 181. The Court rejected that argument, stating that when "it
became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable", the duty of
the Revlon board was then "to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for
the stockholders' benefit." Id. at 182. Obviously, this is consistent with the obligation
of managers to act in the best interests of shareholders.
103. For example, the Principles of Corporate Governance state that a board of
directors facing an unsolicited tender offer may deploy defensive measures "if the
action is a reasonable response to the offer." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §
6.02(a) (1994). The Principles go on to state that in determining whether the action is
"reasonable" the board may "have regard for interests or groups (other than
shareholders) ... if to do so would not significantly disfavor the long-term interests of
shareholders." Id. § 6.02(b)(2) (emphasis added).
The Restatement provides an Illustration that, unfortunately, is more confusing
than enlightening on this matter. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 131 cmt. h, illus. 6.
In the Illustration, the board of Company A determines to deploy defensive tactics in
order to resist an offer to acquire the company "at a price 20 percent above current
market value of the stock." Id. The illustration concludes that "the Board of Directors,
not Lawyer [for the company] has the legal responsibility to determine whether or not
[deploying defensive tactics] ... is in the best interests of [the company]", id., which is
clearly a correct statement in the sense that the board is the correct decision-maker
regarding that particular matter. The Illustration continues by further concluding that
a "[1]awyer may advise the Board of Directors concerning the proposed [deployment of
defensive tactics]", id., and this latter statement may or may not be accurate. If the
lawyer knows that the defensive tactics amount to a violation of the board's fiduciary
obligations to the company's shareholders (thus amounting to "a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization," under Model Rule 1.13(b)), the lawyer is obligated to
take remedial action in the best interests of the company's shareholders.
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embraced by Model Rule 1.13. In each case this gloss clarifies the
lawyer's professional obligation by defining the "client" or the "entity"
in terms of the interests of the corporation's shareholders. The gloss
also promotes a sensible outcome in transactions involving conflicts
among corporate constituencies or possible managerial misconduct.'
2. Recognizing, Reducing, and Resolving conflicts
Even considering the interests of shareholders to be the proper
focus of a corporate lawyer's loyalty under the entity theory leaves a
number of problematic conflicts unresolved. First, lawyers for
corporations face significant "structural" conflicts in that the source
of the lawyer's economic and non-economic benefits is senior officers,
whose interests may often conflict with those of shareholders. 5
Second, lawyers for corporations may face situations in which there
are intra-shareholder conflicts, where some shareholders benefit
from a corporate transaction at the expense of other shareholders."6
Thus, even with a view of the entity theory properly enlightened by
the law of corporations, the potential for serious conflicts confronts
the transactional lawyer.
a. Structural Conflicts
Lawyers for corporations face an inherent structural conflict
because they depend on senior corporate officers for financial
rewards while being obliged by ethical standards to pursue the best
interests of corporate shareholders."°7 Thus, a corporation's lawyer
104. In light of substantive corporate rules respecting the obligations of corporate
managers, we consider it appropriate to define the professional obligations of lawyers
by reference to the interests of shareholders. See discussion supra note 97. It would be
chaotic and counterproductive to expand professional conduct rules to obligate the
company's lawyers to act on behalf of other constituencies, such as creditors and
employees, while substantive corporate rules define the obligations of corporate
managers by reference to the interests of shareholders. Whatever managers'
obligations are, the obligations of the lawyer for the corporation need to be parallel.
However, one of the authors is on record as favoring the expansion of corporate
fiduciary duties to protect other constituencies. See Campbell, supra note 28, at 599-
615 (arguing in favor of fiduciary duties running in favor of corporate creditors and
employees).
105. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.a.
106. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.b.
107. Professor Cramton puts it succinctly when he notes that "[t]he managers, who
hire and fire lawyers, rather than the corporate entity itself, become the client."
Cramton, supra note 15, at 175. Professor Hazard, equally succinctly, notes that "[iun
the practicing lawyer's 'understanding,' the people they talk to in serving the client -
the corporate officers, directors, and other personnel - are their clients. But the law is
otherwise." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It,
6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701, 708 (1993) (emphasis in original). The Cheek Commission
also notes that "the competition to acquire and keep client business, or the desire to
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has a personal, financial interest in currying favor with senior
managers by facilitating any corporate transaction that enhances
their wealth, even if the transaction is not wealth enhancing for
corporate shareholders.
Senior managers' control over a corporation's lawyer's
employment is significant. Corporate counsel is almost always
selected by senior officers, not shareholders. In some cases, the board
may approve the selection of counsel for a particular undertaking,
but in such cases it likely selects counsel proposed by senior officers.
Thereafter, the pay, hours of work, additional assignments,
evaluation, and, if necessary, termination of corporate counsel are
normally determined by senior officers. °8 Pleasing senior officers,
therefore, can have valuable economic and other career consequences
for the corporate lawyer.
One also should not overlook the importance of non-financial
relationships that in many instances bind corporate counsel to senior
officers. Lawyers for the corporation and senior corporate officers
work closely together and often gain respect and feelings of
friendship for one another. In addition, senior officers and counsel for
the corporation are often in a position to help one another in various
non-financial, personal ways. Professional recommendations, access
to membership in clubs, and letters of recommendation for a child
seeking admission to a desirable school are all examples of the types
of benefits that may flow between senior corporate officers and
lawyers for the corporation and that enhance the bond that often
develops between them.
Enron, as the facts have so far been reported, provides a vivid
example of lawyers mired in this sort of deep structural conflict and
the way the conflict can be manipulated by senior officers. A Wall
Street Journal article 9 describes a web of economic and non-
advance within the corporate executive structure, may induce lawyers to seek to
please the corporate officials with whom they deal rather than to focus on the long-
term interest of their client, the corporation." Cheek Commission Final Report, supra
note 9, at 14-15.
108. In our experience as law professors, lawyers, and members of corporate boards,
the board of directors typically exercises little or no control over the selection of
counsel. Certainly this is true in the selection of day-to-day matters requiring legal
counsel. In infrequent instances involving special situations, however, the board may
be made aware of or even approve the lawyer or law firm retained by the company.
Examples of these situations may include counsel retained to advise the company in
the face of an unsolicited takeover bid or regarding a large public offering. Even in
these instances, however, it is likely that the board will choose counsel recommended
by senior officers and then essentially leave it to senior officers to deal with evaluation,
use, and, if required, termination of counsel. In all events, therefore, our experience
suggests that senior managers essentially control the economic fate of the
corporation's lawyers.
109. Pollock, supra note 17, at Al.
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economic relationships, which included annual legal fees paid to the
law firm in the tens of millions of dollars"0 and friendships and
mutual interests shared among the senior officers of Enron and the
senior partners in the company's law firm."' The same article also
reports the pressures certain senior managers put on the company
lawyers to facilitate transactions that effected wealth transfers from
shareholders to the senior officers."' These transactions may have
violated Enron's own conflict of interest policies and transferred
millions of dollars in wealth to the senior officers at the expense of
shareholders and other constituencies."
Situations such as Enron and the other recent high visibility
cases involving unchecked, egregious management misconduct"' may
110. "Enron was... [the firm's] biggest client, pouring roughly $35.6 million into
the firm's coffers in 2001, 7.8% of its revenue." Id.
111.
The firm's partners and Enron were intertwined in Houston's corporate
community. They shared causes ranging from the United Negro College
Fund to electing George W. Bush.... [Enron's CEO and his wife] traveled
the Houston social and charity circuit with [the law firm's managing partner]
and his wife .... The friendship dated from a case [the law firm's managing
partner] .. . handled in 1976 for a [former employer of the Enron CEO].
Id.
112. Id.
113. See Kathryn Kranhold & Mitchell Pacelle, Enron Paid Top Managers $681
Million, Even as Stock Slid, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2002, at B1; Pollock, supra note 17,
at Al.
114. The popular and financial press has reported extensively on these situations.
See David Armstrong & Laurie P. Cohen, Tyco Is Pressing For Repayment Of Loans,
Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at A3 (describing the attempts of Tyco
shareholders to compel executives to repay benefits received during the tenure of a
former CEO and were allegedly not authorized); James Bandler & Jerry Guidera, Tyco
Ex-CEO Threw $2.1 Million Party for Wife, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at A6
(describing that half of the expenses for a $2.1 million birthday party for the wife of a
former Tyco CEO were paid by the company); Charles Gasparino, et al., Salomon Made
IPO Allocations Available to Ebbers, Others, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at Al
(describing allegations of wrongdoing against the former CEO and CFO of Worldcom);
Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Former Tyco Executives Are Charged - New York
Prosecutors Say Ex-CEO, Finance Officer Ran 'Criminal Enterprise', WALL ST. J., Sept.
13, 2002, at A3 (describing allegations of wrongdoing against the former CEO and
CFO of Tyco); Mark Maremont & Laurie P. Cohen, Interior Design On a Budget-The
Tyco Way, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2002, at B1 (describing that the former CEO of Tyco
charged the company for decorations and furnishings for his apartment for which
there was no business justification); Jerry Markon & Robert Frank, Five Adelphia
Officials Arrested on Fraud Charges-Three in the Rigas Family, Two Other Executives
Held, Accused of Massive Looting, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2002, at A3 (describing
allegations of wrongdoing against former senior managers of Adelphia); Julie Rawe,
Heroes to Heels, TIME, Jun. 17, 2002, at 48 (outlining alleged improprieties of
executives of Tyco, Enron, Global Crossing and Adelphia); Jared Sandberg & Deborah
Solomon, Key Officials At WorldCom Going to the Hill, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2002, at
A17 (describing allegations of wrongdoing against the former CEO of Worldcom).
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by themselves make the case for reducing the structural incentives
for corporate lawyers to pursue the interests of managers at the
expense of shareholders. The problem, however, is much deeper than
a few bad situations involving large corporations.
Structural conflicts are not limited to large corporations, such as
Enron. Instead, a structural conflict arises any time corporate
agents, rather than the corporation's owners, control the selection
and compensation of corporate counsel. Even in small, closely held
corporations, senior officers, and not the shareholders, typically
select and monitor corporate counsel.
In addition, the types of transactions that pit the interests of
senior officers against those of shareholders are not limited to
extreme, morally charged situations, such as those reported from the
Enron debacle. Instead, any corporate transaction that may realign
the allocation of corporate control or wealth may pit the interests of
senior officers against the interests of shareholders and thus pose a
conflict for corporate counsel. Such transactions, of course, are
common. The highly visible issue of senior officer compensation
comes to mind. Senior officers, one assumes, want lucrative salary
arrangements, generous perquisites, and large amounts of incentive-
based compensation, and such interests may conflict with the
interests of shareholders, who would be expected to want more
modest compensation arrangements for the officers."5 Another
common example is a hostile takeover bid that offers an attractive
premium to shareholders but moves control of the corporation into
the hands of new managers."6 A more subtle example may involve
moving a corporation's charter from a state with constitutionally
115. For example, it is reported that Dennis Kozlowski, former CEO of Tyco who is
presently under federal indictment, received a total of $97 million "in cash, restricted
stock and other compensation, and has made $240 million in paper profits by
exercising stock options" over the past three fiscal years. Mark Maremont & John
Hechinger, Questioning the Books: Tyco Stock Rises in Huge Volume as Executives Vow
to Buy Shares, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2002, at A8. Likewise, ousted CEOs and the
Boards of Directors from Adelphia and WorldCom have drawn fire for the lucrative
severance packages awarded to departing CEOs, even as they left their respective
companies in various degrees of turmoil. Joann S. Lublin & John Hechinger, Forced
Exits Can Pay Richly for Some CEOs, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2002, at B1. Finally,
although certainly not involved in any of the corporate scandals that have rocked a
number of companies, General Electric's generous retirement package for its retiring
CEO, Jack Welch, has also attracted media attention recently. Matt Murray, SEC
Investigates GE's Retirement Deal With Jack Welch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at B 1.
116. Courts have recognized that managers faced with hostile bids may be
conflicted by their desire to maintain control of their corporation. See, e.g., Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (stating that a board
fighting off an unsolicited bid raises "the omnipresent specter that [it] may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders").
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
mandated cumulative voting117 to a state without mandatory
cumulative voting, '18 as a way to make it harder for insurgents to
gain a foothold on the corporation's board.
These examples demonstrate that the implications of the
structural conflict in which lawyers for corporations find themselves
go well beyond the few egregious cases so far reported in the
financial press. The elements of the structural conflict exist in nearly
all corporations, and the conflict becomes troublesome in any
transaction that involves the allocation of corporate wealth or
control. One should not, therefore, consider Enron a case in which
some unusual confluence of events subjected lawyers to pressures
that are unlikely ever to occur again.
We propose a structural remedy for this structural conflict. The
responsibility for the selection of the corporation's lawyer should be
moved into the hands of a decision-maker that better represents the
interests of shareholders. The most appropriate corporate decision-
maker for that responsibility is the corporation's independent audit
committee.
The wide-spread use of audit committees is a relatively new
occurrence.' 9 It grew out of the recognition that auditors could not be
counted on to be independent and aggressive in their audit if they
were selected by or under the control or influence of senior
management. After all, auditors are expected to investigate the
performance of senior management and report the results of that
investigation to the owners of the corporation. As a result, many
corporations, encouraged by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and listing requirements of securities exchanges,
established audit committees of the board of directors to select or
recommend the corporation's auditor and be available to work with
117. Kentucky, for example, until recently had a constitutional provision mandating
cumulative voting. KY. CONST. § 207 (repealed 2002) (requiring cumulative voting in
all elections for corporate directors); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.7-280 (Michie 1989)
(implementing KY. CONST. § 207). In November, 2002, Kentucky amended its
constitution to eliminate mandatory cumulative voting, KY. CONST. § 207 (Michie
Supp. 2003), and the Kentucky General Assembly amended sections 271B.7-280 of the
Kentucky Code to establish straight voting for corporate directors, unless the
corporation's articles of incorporation provide for cumulative voting. KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271B.7-280 (Michie Supp. 2003).
118. Delaware is an example of a state without mandatory cumulative voting. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (2001) (permitting non-cumulative voting).
119. See, e.g., Helen S. Scott, The SEC, the Audit Committee Rules, and the
Marketplaces: Corporate Governance and the Future, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 551-57
(2001) (reporting that the SEC's interest in promoting audit committees goes back to
the 1940s, but that it was only in the 1970s that self-regulatory organizations,
encouraged by the SEC, first required audit committees as a listing requirement).
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the auditor on financial matters growing out of the audit.2 ° The
obvious theory of the independent audit committee was to eliminate
the conflict under which auditors labored when they were selected by
senior officers.1"'
We find sufficient similarities between the independent auditors
and the lawyers for a corporation to support our recommendation
that the audit committee should select the company's lawyers.'22 Both
the company's auditors and lawyers are assigned important roles in
protecting the constituency of primary concern-the shareholders of
the corporation."3 Also, both are exposed to untoward pressures, if we
allow managers to control the selection and monitoring of these two
gatekeepers. Notwithstanding the efforts of honest and decent
auditors and lawyers, it becomes more difficult for them to perform
their duties vigorously on behalf of their corporate clients if they can
be fired by managers with economic interests that are not always
aligned with the interests of those clients. For the benefit of
shareholders, society, and even the professionals involved, we
recommend an enhanced utilization of the audit committee as a way
120. Ira M. Millstein, Introduction to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54
Bus. LAW. 1057, 1062 (1999) ("By the mid-1970s, the SEC had solidified its view that
some independent internal board mechanism was needed to ensure accountability of
management."); id. at 551 ("It was, in large measure, with the Commission's
encouragement, for instance, that the self-regulatory organizations first adopted audit
committee requirements in the 1970s.").
121. See, e.g., The Overview Committee of the Board of Directors: A Report by the
Committee on Corporate Laws, 34 BUS. LAW. 1837, 1861 (1979) (describing a limited
version of the purpose of the audit committee as "providing an opportunity for direct
communication with the Board of Directors by the corporation's independent auditors,
thereby tending to strengthen their independence and objectivity"); see also Edward F.
Greene & Bernard B. Falk, The Audit Committee-A Measured Contribution to
Corporate Governance: A Realistic Appraisal of Its Objectives and Functions, 34 BUS.
LAW. 1229 (1979) (discussing the duties and objectives of the audit committees); see
generally Charles B. Tomm, Director and Audit Committee Responsibilities Relating to
Perquisites, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83 (1979) (discussing the role and responsibilities
of the audit committees).
122. In its Final Report, however, the Cheek Commission states:
The Task Force acknowledges that lawyers for the corporation-whether
employed by the corporation or specially retained-are not "gatekeepers" of
corporate responsibility in the same fashion as public accounting firms. ...
The auditor is subject to standards designed to assure an arm's length
perspective relative to the firms they audit. In contrast, as several
commentators pointed out in the public hearings on the Preliminary Report,
corporate lawyers are first and foremost counselors to their clients.
Cheek Commission Final Report, supra note 9, at 22-23. We disagree with any
suggestion that lawyers for corporations are not to act as gatekeepers on behalf of the
best interests of the shareholders of the corporation they represent.
123. The corporation's auditors and its lawyers also both play a correspondingly
important role in protecting society itself.
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to ameliorate pernicious pressures"' on these important corporategatekeepers.'
124. We appreciate that our prescription is not a complete remedy in all cases.
Audit committees are only as effective as their members and, especially, their chair.
Thus, our prescription will be ineffective if the audit committee and its chair abdicate
their obligations in favor of senior management. As the Cheek Commission notes, even
outside directors sometimes defer too much to senior executive officers in selecting
professional advisers, Cheek Commission Final Report, supra note 9, at 25-26, a
product of the "culture of passivity" on many corporate boards of directors. Id. at 27.
Also, in selecting and evaluating counsel, the audit committee will have to depend to
some extent on input from senior management. For example, in determining whether
to retain last year's counsel for the next year, the audit committee should seek an
evaluation from senior management as to the quality of the counsel's work last year.
Thus, corporate counsel will continue to have some incentive to please senior
management.
We do not consider these problems sufficient bases to reject our proposal. Most
importantly, many audit committees and their chairs will treat these responsibilities
seriously and fulfill their obligations in a meaningful fashion. In such cases, the
committee, although soliciting input from senior management, will retain control over
the lawyers and significantly change the otherwise misaligned incentives of the
company's lawyers. Perhaps we might expect corporate boards of directors to "abandon
the passive role many have been content to play, and replace it with a new culture
stressing constructive skepticism and an active, independent oversight role," as the
Cheek Commission hopes, id. at 29, in the post-Enron corporate environment.
We also observe that both issues-possible audit committee abdication of
responsibilities and contamination from senior officer evaluation input-are present
when the audit committee selects the company's auditors. We doubt that anyone would
seriously argue at this point that these problems support allowing senior management
to select auditors.
125. We anticipate objections to this solution, some of which will undoubtedly be
based on practical considerations. We are of the view, however, that if a company's
audit committee focuses on the underlying policy supporting our prescription-which
is to remove the economic incentives that lawyers have to facilitate transactions that
are not in the best interests of shareholders-thoughtful and involved audit
committees can develop procedures that will allow them to fulfill their obligations
efficiently and in a manner that is consistent with their duty of care.
Consider for example, an extreme situation in which a large insurance company has
hundreds of lawyers throughout the world representing it in litigation. In these
circumstances, the audit committee, consistent with its duty of care, would be expected
to exercise less hands-on management of these trial lawyers, since the cases may often
involve relatively small matters. More importantly, these are not the types of
transactions in which the self-interests of managers diverge dramatically from those of
shareholders. In such instances, the audit committee could appropriately delegate to
the company's internal legal department the responsibility to propose law firms,
monitor their work, and report to the audit committee.
On the other hand, the audit committee should itself be directly involved in the
selection and monitoring of lawyers representing the company in major transactions
and in securities matters. In these transactions, senior managers may have interests
that do not necessarily track the interests of shareholders. Examples of such
transactions would include SEC periodic reporting and proxy solicitation under the
1934 Act, significant financing transactions, corporate reorganizations, freezeout
transactions, and defending against unsolicited takeover bids. It is in transactions
2003] TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AS GATEKEEPERS 45
We suggest that audit committees be delegated the responsibility
of selecting the company's lawyer as a means to reduce the conflict
that corporate lawyers face when they are hired, evaluated and, at
times, fired by corporate managers." 6 We recognize, however, that
this change would not entirely erase the structural conflict, just as
auditors' conflicts are not erased by audit committee selection. It
would be naive to think that such a change would overcome such
persistent pressures.
Ultimately, we must hope, as we do with lawyers generally, that
corporate lawyers are able to resist the substantial personal interests
that can affect their independent professional judgment in
representing clients. We believe, however, that the analogy to
auditors and thus the argument in favor of moving control of the
corporation's lawyers to the audit committee are compelling,
especially if we are seeking more independence of lawyers for
such as these that managers may, contrary to the best interests of shareholders, have
an interest in restricted information flows or constructing outcomes that transfer
wealth to themselves or other favored constituencies.
While one should be wary of a one-size-fits-all approach to procedures to be used in
selection of the company's lawyers, audit committees under our proposal could select
the company's law firms annually and could handle the task similarly to the way it
selects the company's auditors. Thus, late in the year, the committee could meet to
select the firms that will, for example, handle the company's transactional work for the
next year, and, in the case of our insurance company example in the prior paragraph,
the committee could select firms that will handle litigation matters for the year. We,
certainly, would propose no requirement that the committee bid out the work each
year. Instead, the selection procedure would be a matter of the business judgment of
the committee. Obviously, the committee would want to examine the quality and
quantity of the firm's last year's work, if the choice were to continue with the same
firm for the upcoming year. The committee would also want to keep its hands around
fees and to monitor the amount and quality of the work undertaken during the
upcoming year.
126. The Cheek Commission proposed what we consider an overly modest solution
for the structural conflict faced by lawyers for corporations. Their prescription is for
the company's general counsel to establish a "direct line of communication" with the
company's lawyers "through which these lawyers are to inform the general counsel
of... violations of law ... and breaches of fiduciary duty." The general counsel, in
turn, is to meet "regularly... with a committee of independent directors to
communicate concerns regarding legal compliance matters, including.., violations of
law.., and breaches of fiduciary duty." Cheek Commission Final Report, supra note 9,
Recommended Policies of Corporate Governance 7, at 32.
We consider this a decidedly inferior prescription for the structural conflict we
identify. Lawyers for the company, under the Cheek Commission proposal, still depend
on senior management for their financial rewards. We find little progress in merely
assigning another member of senior management-the general counsel-
responsibilities to monitor lawyers for the company and report potential misconduct to
independent directors. Only by moving the control over the lawyers' rewards away
from senior management can we remove the structural pressures that make it difficult
for corporate lawyers to align themselves with the best interests of their corporate
clients as reflected in the best interests of the shareholders.
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corporations. If more is to be expected of corporate lawyers as
gatekeepers in protecting the interests of shareholders and society,
the structural conflict under which transactional lawyers for
corporations labor must be recognized, confronted, and reduced.
b. Intra-Shareholder Conflicts
The gloss that, we suggest, the law of corporations gives to the
entity theory-that the best interests of the entity should be equated
with the best interests of shareholders-is helpful in illuminating the
lawyer's responsibilities when the corporate client proposes actions
that affect the corporate constituencies differently. When the
proposed corporate action creates conflicts within the shareholder
constituency itself, however, this gloss does nothing to resolve the
dilemma created for the corporation's lawyer. Two examples of
common transactions fitting this pattern demonstrate the problem.
The first situation, already relied upon above,27 involves a
transaction in which Aggressor proposes to acquire all the common
stock of Target at two times its market value in a highly leveraged
transaction. If we now assume that Target also has outstanding
preferred stock that will not be exchanged or purchased in the
acquisition, 2 ' the preferred shareholders will likely face a decrease in
the market value of their stock as a result of the additional
leverage.129 Under -these assumptions, the transaction benefits
common shareholders but harms preferred shareholders, thus
placing the interests of the two groups of shareholders in conflict.3
A second problematic situation is presented when the majority
shareholders of a corporation, with the help of the majority's
127. See supra text accompanying note 93.
128. That is, the preferred shareholders will continue as investors in Target
following the acquisition of all the common stock of Target by Aggressor.
129. See, e.g., Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 1985 WL 21145 (Del. Ch.
1985). KKR Associates was to acquire all the common stock of Amstar in a highly
leveraged acquisition that left the preferred stockholders of Amstar outstanding but
subject to the prior claims of the new debt generated by the transaction. Id. at *2.
Preferred shareholders sued, and the Chancery Court held that their complaint stated
a cause of action. Id. at *5. The court first observed that "the public preferred
stockholders were left holding their shares in a corporation which, as a result of the
transaction, has a much greater debt and therefore perhaps a lessened ability to pay
preferred dividends." Id. The court concluded that "plaintiff has a cause of action...
as to the allegations which attack the leveraged buy-out and its effect on the preferred
stockholders." Id.
130. For an example of such a situation in which conflicts arise between the
interests of preferred and common shareholders, see Bowman v. Armour & Co., 160
N.E. 2d 753, 757-58 (Ill. 1959), in which an amendment to the articles of incorporation
changed the redemption right of preferred shareholders. See Bove v. Cmty. Hotel Corp.
of Newport, R.I., 249 A.2d 89, 91-92 (R.I. 1969) (affiliated merger changing preferred
shares into common shares).
[Vol. 56:1
2003] TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AS GATEKEEPERS 47
nominees on the board of directors, propose a freezeout of the
corporation's minority shareholders at an unfairly low price and ask
the company's lawyer to lend assistance to the deal. In this case, the
transaction benefits majority common shareholders and harms
minority common shareholders.'
It is apparent that both of these situations involve conflicting
interests within the company's shareholder constituency and that
this conflict renders our suggested general principle, equating the
best interests of the entity and the best interests of shareholders,
unhelpful in guiding the lawyer's behavior. At the same time, the
lawyer faced with these situations must keep in mind two additional
concerns involving the professional responsibility of those
representing corporations. First is the concern about lawyers'
engaging in multiple representations. 3' Second is the restriction on a
corporate lawyer's providing assistance to a manager's breach of
fiduciary duty to the corporation.33
As to the first concern, the specter of the lawyer representing
multiple parties with conflicting interests in these two situations
underscores the functional value of the entity theory. Even though
the interests of shareholders should normally be equated with the
entity's interests, if the concept of corporate representation is to
continue, the shareholders themselves cannot be treated as the
lawyer's clients. In addition to disrupting the doctrinal resolution of
several other issues pertinent to legal representations,' doing so
would present frequent, insoluble instances of multiple
representations in situations similar to the two under discussion.'
131. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (discussing
freezeout in which minority shareholders claimed they received unfair treatment).
132. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.9 (2003).
133. This restriction is provided in the original and the 2003 amended version of
Model Rule 1.13(b). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983).
134. For a discussion of other areas of law that are aided by the entity theory of
conceptualizing the organizational client, see supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
135. It is not difficult to illustrate the complexities the lawyer would face in these
two situations if we were to consider the corporate lawyer's clients to be the
shareholders themselves. Since in both scenarios the interests of some shareholders
are directly adverse to the interests of other shareholders, if the shareholders were
viewed as the lawyer's clients, the dictates of Model Rule 1.7 would come into play.
Under that rule, to continue representing the shareholders as clients under these
circumstances, the lawyer would be required to believe reasonably that she could
competently and diligently represent each group of shareholders (both the preferred
and common shareholders in the first situation and the majority and minority common
shareholders in the second). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1) (2003). In
addition, the lawyer would have to obtain and have confirmed in writing the consent of
both groups of shareholders to continue the multiple representation. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4).
Setting aside the question of how the lawyer would go about obtaining such consent
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In situations involving intra-shareholder conflicts, the entity
theory allows the lawyer to surmount concerns about multiple
representation. Even if we generally equate the best interests of the
entity with the best interests of the shareholders broadly, treating
the entity as the client allows the lawyer to continue the
representation despite the conflicting interests of the two groups of
shareholders. At the same time, the entity theory also permits an
application of the concepts of attorney-client privilege and
confidentiality that allows the lawyer to use information relating to
the representation even if it may harm the interests of some
shareholders.3 " As a result of the entity theory, therefore, in
following the directions of the managers lawfully authorized to speak
for the corporation, the lawyer is free to continue the representation
despite its negative effect on some shareholders. Thus, using the first
of our two examples, the lawyer is not in a conflict situation when
lending assistance to the highly leveraged acquisition, since the
lawyer's client is the corporation, not the preferred shareholders.
Similarly, in the second example, the lawyer is viewed as
representing only the corporation and not majority or minority
and how unlikely it would be for the shareholders to grant that consent if it could be
sought practically, it is difficult to see how the lawyer could make the determination
that her relationship with one group would not adversely affect the competence and
diligence in her representation of the other. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1); 1.7(b)(4). This would mean
that the lawyer could not ethically represent both groups of shareholders in these two
situations. The comment to Model Rule 1.7 also deals with the situation in which a
conflict arises mid-stream, and it states that in that case "the lawyer ordinarily must
withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed
consent of the client." Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 4.
Further, if the lawyer were to make this determination properly and decide to
withdraw from the representation of one of the groups of shareholders in these
situations (say, the preferred shareholders in the first situation and the minority
common shareholders in the second), the lawyer would also need to follow the
requirements of Model Rule 1.9(a) in continuing the representation of the other group
of shareholders. Since the lawyer would be continuing the representation against her
now former clients (the abandoned preferred shareholders or minority common
shareholders), the lawyer would be required to obtain the consent of those former
clients. Id. R. 1.9(a). The Comment, in conjunction with Rule 1.9(a), goes on to permit
the lawyer who withdraws because of the occurrence of a mid-stream conflict, to
continue to represent one of the parties only if "the former client gives informed
consent, confirmed in writing. Id. R. 1.9(a). Again, the practical barriers to and the
unlikely success in obtaining this consent make the continued representation by the
lawyer inappropriate. Thus, if we were to treat the shareholders themselves as the
lawyer's clients, she would have to resign from the representation entirely once the
conflict between shareholders developed. Furthermore, any other lawyer hired to
represent the corporation would face the same difficulty.
136. For a brief discussion of the concepts of privilege and confidentiality in
corporate representation, see supra note 33.
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common shareholders.'37 Defining the lawyer's duty by reference to
the corporate entity as a whole, therefore, leads to a workable and an
appealing outcome because it permits the representation of the
corporation in the transaction despite the conflicting interests of
groups of shareholders resulting from its representation.
This brings us, however, to the second professional concern the
corporate lawyer must address in these conflict situations. While the
lawyer may surmount the professional problems associated with
multiple representation, he still must be concerned about the
potential for the managers' breach of their fiduciary duty to the
corporation. For the lawyer, this is a matter of professional ethics
under Model Rule 1.13(b) 38 and of potential civil liability as well.'39
The lawyer may be free to advise and assist the managers proposing
the recapitalization or the freezeout, but in order to avoid these twin
difficulties he must be sure that he is mindful of the managers'
duties of care and loyalty to the shareholders who are negatively
affected.
The legal duty owed by the managers to the shareholders thus
becomes important in determining the professional duty of the
lawyer. The freeze-out of minority shareholders, described above, 4'
137. This conclusion is supported variously. Perhaps most directly and importantly,
both the original and amended versions of Model Rule 1.13 state that a lawyer for a
corporation "represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2003); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1983). The Comment to both versions of that rule deals
with the situation in which the
organization's interest.., become[s] adverse to those of one or more of its
constituents. In such circumstances, the lawyer should advise any
constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the
organization of the conflict ... that the lawyer cannot represent such
constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent
representation.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 7 (1983). The Restatement also states that a lawyer "represents
the interests of the organization" and that this "'entity' theory of organizational
representation.., is now universally recognized in American law." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 30, § 96 cmt. b. The Restatement also speaks of the obligation of the lawyer
to "proceed in what the lawyer reasonably believes to be the best interests of the
organization." Id. cmt. f. Further, the Restatement pointedly notes that "[a] lawyer
representing only the organization has no duty to protect one constituent from
another, including from a breach by one constituent of such fiduciary duties, unless
the interests of the lawyer's client organization are at risk." Id. cmt. g.
138. As discussed above, under that rule a lawyer for a corporation is required to
take remedial action when a manager's proposed action will violate a duty to the
corporation. See supra text accompanying notes 47-57.
139. By assisting managers' breach of fiduciary duties, the lawyer could become
liable as well. See Lawyers' Manual, supra note 12, at 91:2005.
140. See supra text accompanying note 131.
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illustrates this point. Were they to be challenged, the actions of
managers in proposing and facilitating this transaction would likely
be judged under the fiduciary standard of "intrinsic fairness", which
includes not only the component of fair price but also that of fair
dealing."" Managers meet their fair dealing obligations by
establishing procedures that ensure fair treatment of minority
shareholders. In applying this standard, courts typically are
interested in whether minority shareholders are protected by
independent negotiating committees and receive free flow of all
material information and appropriate professional assistance, such
as that from investment bankers. Failure by the managers to
establish such procedures of fair dealing may cause a court to find a
breach of the managers' duty of loyalty, a component of their
fiduciary duties to the corporation. A lawyer who fails to recognize
this and assists with the transaction faces possible professional
discipline and potential civil liability as well.'
Under an application of our suggested gloss to the entity theory,
in which the entity's interests are equated with the best interests of
the shareholders, the corporate lawyer must remain alert to conflicts
within the shareholder constituency. In the face of such conflicts, the
entity theory permits the lawyer to continue to represent the
corporation and to further transactions that favor the interests of
some shareholders over the interests of others. The lawyer must be
vigilant in protecting the fiduciary rights of all the shareholders,
however, and must be cautious about transactions that would violate
the legal obligations of managers to those shareholders. This again
takes us to proposed transactions that appear to go too far.
B. Protecting the Client and Society from Managers' Misconduct
As discussed above,' the Model Rules recognize that a lawyer
representing a corporation may face situations involving
inappropriate conduct by corporate managers. While lawyers are
generally expected to comply with directions from managers as the
duly authorized agents of the corporation, " 5 both the 1983 and 2003
versions of Model Rule 1.13(b) direct the lawyer to take remedial
141. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (holding that the merger did not satisfy the
intrinsic fairness test).
142. See supra notes 138-39.
143. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
144. Corporate managers include officers and other managerial employees and thus
are included among the persons about whose actions lawyers must be concerned under
that rule. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (2003); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (1983).
145. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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action when misconduct by the managers or agents is sufficiently
severe.
146
If the corporate lawyer is to serve as a gatekeeper for his client's
conduct, however, the duty encompassed in Model Rule 1.13(b) is
inadequate. It demands too high a level of certainty before the lawyer
has a duty to act to protect the best interests of the corporate entity,
which the law of corporations equates with the interests of the
shareholders. It also narrows the duty to act in other ways that
undermine the role of lawyers as effective gatekeepers of corporate
conduct.
1. The Lawyer's Knowledge of Wrongdoing
Under the 1983 version of Model Rule 1.13(b) a lawyer is
required to act to protect the interests of the corporation when she
"knows" that the actions of a corporate manager violate a legal
obligation to the corporation.'47 Under the "terminology" portion of
the Model Rules, the term "knows" refers to "actual knowledge of the
fact in question," although "knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances."'48  Thus the Model Rules eschew an objective
standard in such cases, 4 ' opting instead to judge the propriety of the
lawyer's conduct under a subjective, actual knowledge standard."'
146. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
147. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983). Nothing in the Model
Rules prohibits or discourages a corporate lawyer from taking the same sort of
remedial action even when she is not certain about the constituent misconduct she
fears. Indeed, the comments to the 2003 amendment to Model Rule 1.13 expressly
note:
Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to
proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client,
including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes
to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the
organization.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt.4 (2003). While permissible under the
Rules, we might expect that practical realities of the representation of corporate
clients probably render such voluntary action unlikely. For purposes of this article, our
focus is on the lawyer's duty to act as a gatekeeper, not the lawyer's freedom to do so.
148. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2003) (defining "knowingly,"
"known," or "knows."). This definition was also used in the original version of the
Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Terminology (1983).
149. Section 96(2) of the Restatement also contains a "knows" standard for when the
lawyer must take remedial steps in the face of a breach of a fiduciary duty by a
corporate manager, but Comment e to that Section suggests a negligence standard.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 96 cmt. e ("The lawyer... must not knowingly or
negligently assist any constituent to breach a legal duty to the organization.")
(emphasis added).
150. A "knows" or "actual knowledge" standard is generally considered a subjective
standard and is not measured by reference to an objective criterion. For example,
Section 102(a) of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act states that one "knows a fact if
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This subjective standard in Model Rule 1.13(b) was recently the
subject of scrutiny by the American Bar Association. That
organization's Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, the so-called
Cheek Commission, recommended a change from the subjective
standard in the 1983 version of Model Rule 1.13 to an objective
standard. 5 ' Unfortunately, the ABA in its August 2003 revision of
Model Rule 1.13 rejected the objective standard proposed by the
Cheek Commission."2 As a result, Model Rule 1.13(b) continues to
obligate the lawyer for a corporation to take remedial steps only if
the lawyer "knows" that the actions of a manager violate his legal
obligations to the corporation.
In January 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
acting under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,' 3  adopted an objective
standard in its new rules applicable to lawyers who practice before
the Commission.' The SEC's rules require those lawyers to take
remedial action in instances where "it would be unreasonable" for the
lawyer "not to conclude that it is reasonably likely" that a violation of
the person has actual knowledge of it." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 102(a) (1997). A Comment
adds the following: "[k]nowledge is cognitive awareness." Id. In an article that became
the foundation for some of the early works discussing the "scienter" requirement under
Rule 10b-5, Professor Page Keeton discussed the culpability predicate for
misrepresentation: "it has been said that knowledge on the part of the misrepresenter
of the falsity of his statement is a prerequisite to recovery. This is often taken to mean
that he must at least believe that the fact asserted to exist does not." Page Keeton,
Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 UCLA L. REV. 583, 589 (1958).
151. The Cheek Commission's Preliminary Report recommended that Model Rule
1.13(b) be amended to require remedial actions by a lawyer when she "knows or
reasonably should know" of misconduct. Cheek Commission Preliminary Report, supra
note 9, at 204. The Commission's recommendation of such an objective standard
received opposition. See, e.g., ACCA Submission, supra note 10, at 5. The American
Corporate Counsel Association, for example, objected to the Cheek Commission's
proposal, contending that the change will "shift the lawyer's attention away from
healthy participation and inquiry into the client's day-to-day actions by mandating a
new role for corporate counsel as a full-time in-house investigator." Id. The ACCA also
predicted such an objective standard will cause corporate clients to be less welcoming
of lawyer "participation on the management team." Id. at 6. The Cheek Commission's
Final Report revised but continued to propose an objective standard by recommending
that a lawyer be required to act under Model Rule 1.13(b) when she "knows facts from
which a reasonable lawyer, under the circumstances, would conclude" that misconduct
was occurring. Cheek Commission Final Report, supra note 9, at 42-44, 82.
152. For a description of the ABA House of Delegates' consideration of the proposed
amendments to Model Rule 1.13, see Lawyers' Manual, supra note 12, 19 Current
Reports 467-69 (Aug. 13, 2003).
153. § 307, 115 Stat. at 375.
154. Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Prof l Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823,
at 87,069 (Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/ruleslfinal33-8185.htm.
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securities laws or fiduciary duties has or is about to occur."' Thus,
the Commission will hold securities lawyers to an objective standard,
while the American Bar Association has refused to do so.
In light of Enron and other corporate debacles, the actual
knowledge standard of Model Rule 1.13(b) is an overly lax,
inappropriate measure of a lawyer's obligation to protect the
interests of his client.5 ' While we support a move to a more rigorous,
objective standard, the standard we articulate differs somewhat from
that used in the Commission's Sarbanes-Oxley rules or proposed by
the Cheek Commission.
To illuminate our criticisms of the actual knowledge criterion as
the proper measure of a lawyer's conduct, consider the impact of the
standard in the context of an illustration from the Restatement in
which the lawyer for the corporation is requested by the corporation's
president to lend assistance to an unwarranted corporate gift to a
friend of the president."7 Assume that the lawyer incorrectly
concludes that the gift does not amount to a violation of the
president's fiduciary duties to the corporation, takes no remedial
action, and lends assistance to the transaction. In such
circumstances, the lawyer's conduct does not violate the actual
knowledge standard of Model Rule 1.13(b), even if the lawyer's
incorrect conclusion is inconsistent with ordinary care or, indeed,
even if the lawyer's incorrect conclusion is so unreasonable as to
amount to an extreme deviation from ordinary care, a common
155. Id. A lawyer subject to the Commission's rule is obligated to take remedial
action when he "becomes aware of evidence of a material violation." 17 C.F.R. §
205.3(b) (2003). A "material violation" includes violations of "federal or state securities
law," a "breach of fiduciary duty" or a "similar material violation". 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i).
"Evidence of a material violation" is defined as "credible evidence, based upon which it
would be unreasonable ... for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that
it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur." 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e).
156. Conditioning the lawyer's duty to act on the highest level of certainty, the
"knowing" standard, can be viewed as "pro-lawyer" in its orientation, insulating the
profession to a maximum extent from any responsibility for inaction in a given matter.
It can also be regarded as "pro-client", since the lawyer will likely be inclined to cause
disruption within the corporation only in the most glaring instances of constituent
impropriety. In the post-Enron world, however, neither characterization is appealing.
Certainly the public is now less likely to be accepting of ethical measures intended
to be protective of lawyers in the corporate setting. Furthermore, the rule's knowing
standard can be viewed as "pro-client" only if the best interests of the corporation are
equated with the interests of the managers of the corporation rather than those of its
shareholders. Properly equating the corporate client's best interests with the best
interests of shareholders, however, renders the "knowing" standard of Model Rule
1.13(b) distinctly "anti-client" in its orientation.
157. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, §96, illus. 1.
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formulation for recklessness.5 ' This example thus shows that the
subjective standard of the 1983 and 2003 versions of Model Rule
1.13(b) provides inadequate incentive for the corporate lawyer to act
in the best interests of her client.
Even more troubling, the "knowing" standard also tends to
promote a course of willful blindness on the part of the corporate
lawyer, even when managerial misconduct might be suspected."9
Such an approach is risky for the lawyer, since the Model Rules'
definition of "knows" notes that "knowledge may be inferred from the
circumstances,"160 and courts in many contexts are not receptive to
such studied ignorance as a defense.16" ' Still, the "knowing" standard
invites the lawyer to inflate, perhaps generate, sophistical
justifications for the gift in order to avoid the duty to react to
managerial misconduct. 6' Corporate lawyers' natural desire to please
managers and their expected deference to managers' business
decisions provide ample motivation for this reluctance to conclude
that Model Rule 1.13(b)'s duty to take remedial action applies.'63
158. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th
Cir. 1977) (a Rule 10b-5 case in which the court defined recklessness as "not merely
simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care."). As Professor Cramton notes, under Model Rule 1.13(b) lawyers are
held to 'a less demanding scienter standard in professional discipline cases ... than
the standard that lay persons must meet to avoid criminal and civil liability."
Cramton, supra note 15, at 148.
159. The Cheek Commission's Preliminary Report observed that corporate lawyers
have been criticized 'for turning a blind eye to the natural consequences of what they
observe and claiming that they did not 'know' that the corporate officers they were
advising were engaged in misconduct." Cheek Commission Preliminary Report, supra
note 9, at 208.
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2003).
161. See WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 696; Cramton, supra note 15, at 149.
162. In response to, the assertion that lawyers cannot ever "know" what a client
intends, Professor Hazard notes:
Of course, speaking in terms of radical epistemology, it is true that a lawyer
cannot "know" what a client - or anyone else - intends. In these terms it is
impossible for a lawyer to "know" anything. Yet the practice of law is based
on practical knowledge, that is, practical assessments leading to empirical
conclusions which form the basis for irrevocable action. Lawyers certainly
possess such practical knowledge. If a lawyer can have practical knowledge
of how the purposes of others may affect his client, he can have the same
knowledge of how his client's purposes may affect others. It is in that sense
that the lawyer can "know" when a client's purpose is illegal.
Hazard, supra note 34, at 672.
163. Professor Cramton observes that the problem originates in corporate lawyers
mistakenly equating the roles of advisors in transactions with advocates in litigation.
See Cramton, supra note 15, at 173. He notes:
These lawyers take the position that they must do everything for the client
that the client's managers want them to do, providing the conduct is
permitted by law. The problem is that by constantly going to the edge of the
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As a professional standard, the "knowing" threshold in Model
Rule 1.13(b) is too forgiving of careless and inappropriate conduct by
lawyers. Such a lax standard is impossible to reconcile with any
claim that the legal profession requires sensible, fair, and demanding
conduct from its members or that members of the profession function
as gatekeepers. Indeed, this actual knowledge standard in Model
Rule 1.13(b) seems generally inconsistent with the broader duty of
providing competent representation to the client under Model Rule
1.1.164
What is needed is a standard that reaches both incompetent and
evasive lawyers, and this requires an objective criterion rooted firmly
in a reasonableness or negligence standard. In order to protect
law and taking a very permissive view of what the law permits, these
lawyers gradually adopt a mindset that ignores and may eventually assist
the client's managers in illegality that harms third persons and the client
entity.
Id. This mindset is furthered by various rationalizations and psychological tendencies
for persons facing a choice among only unappealing alternatives, such as that between
the options of aiding managerial fraud or taking remedial action. See id. at 174.
164. Model Rule 1.1 states: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for representation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003). One might speculate that most cautious lawyers seeking to
provide competent representation to their corporate clients would employ a more
demanding standard than "actual knowledge" when confronting potentially
inappropriate managerial conduct. Professor Cramton notes that lawyers should be
inclined to do so in order to avoid the later application of the "hindsight bias", making
"defendants appear more culpable than they may be" in reviewing any later
allegations of civil fraud. See Cramton, supra note 15, at 147. Indeed, "the courts may
impose liability on a corporate lawyer for failing to take reasonable protective action to
safeguard the corporate client against the wrongful acts of its officers." Hazard,
Lawyers and Client Fraud, supra note 107, at 708. Therefore, it would seem that
lawyers should be inclined to be more vigilant than the "knowledge" standard
warrants.
165. Our effort to find both an objective standard and a measure that significantly
expands the corporate lawyer's duty to take remedial action under Model Rule 1.13(b)
is justified on two grounds. The first is that the duty to take remedial action is limited
to taking such action within the corporation itself. This is clear under the original
version of Model Rule 1.13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983).
Even under the 2003 amendments to Model Rule 1.13(b), a lawyer is merely permitted
to make disclosures beyond the corporate confines under certain circumstances, not
required to do so. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2003). Given that the
duty in the original and amended Model Rule 1.13 does not mandate public
disclosures, it is hard to imagine why the standard of knowledge should be set high. If
corporate lawyers are to act to protect the best interests of the shareholders, as we
assert they should, a low threshold for doing so serves that purpose more effectively
than a high standard.
Our second ground for asserting that a more expansive duty is called for is the likely
response of lawyers to whatever standard is inserted. Lawyers will predictably and
naturally construe in a narrow fashion any standard for triggering the duty to take
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sufficiently the interests of shareholders and to define an appropriate
professional standard for lawyers, we contend that a "reasonably
should believe" standard is the most promising.'66 Under this
approach, a lawyer for a corporation would be obligated to take
remedial action when a lawyer of reasonable prudence and
competence would suppose that the action proposed by the manager
amounts to a breach of that manager's duty to the corporation or is
unlawful."7
Our proposed objective standard for Model Rule 1.13(b) would
enhance the gatekeeper role of lawyers and increase public
confidence in sound corporate governance in the post-Enron
environment.168 In addition, the broader objective standard will bring
remedial action. This tendency is already evident in lawyers' reluctance to conclude
that they "know" that a constituent is engaged in misconduct warranting such action
on their part. If an expanded gatekeeper role for lawyers is to be implemented, it is
likely to be necessary to draw the duty sufficiently broadly to counteract lawyers'
predictable tendency to whittle it down in application.
166. The Terminology section of the Model Rules offers several possible alternatives
for consideration. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2003). One is that the
lawyer "believe" that a constituent is about to engage in misconduct relative to the
corporate client. Id. 1.0(a). Under the definition offered for this standard, the lawyer
would be expected to act when she "supposed the fact in question to be true." Id. This
term, though offering a standard less demanding than actual knowledge, suffers from
the same shortcomings of the current standard. See id. R. 1.0(f). Like the "knowing"
standard, it hinges the duty to take remedial action on the lawyer's subjective state of
mind, leaving the careless lawyer and the lawyer intentionally seeking to avoid taking
remedial action beyond the reach of the duty.
The Model Rules also offer the standard of "reasonably should know," which
"denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the
matter in question." Id. R. 1.0(j). This standard interjects an objective element into the
standard, compelling the lawyer to consider not only his own state of knowledge
regarding the pending constituent misconduct but that state of knowledge which a
reasonable lawyer would have under the circumstances. Because it incorporates the
"knowing" standard, it still is diminished by the degree of certainty that it demands. A
lawyer under the "reasonably should know" standard may well find it as easy to find
doubt for the "lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence" as it was for himself
under the present subjective standard. Id. R. 1.0(j).
167. The threshold for remedial action could be set even lower. In their 1996 article,
Professor Painter and Ms. Duggan urged the passage of federal securities legislation
that would give further guidance to securities lawyers confronting client fraud. See
Painter & Duggan, supra note 61, at 226-29. In that article, the authors suggested
that a lawyer who "'becomes aware of information that an illegal act has occurred'"
should be expected to report to a higher authority in the corporation. See id. at 261
(quoting Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §
301(a)(1), 109 Stat. 737). In interpreting their own standard, the authors noted that
"[a] lawyer need not be absolutely certain of an illegal act in order to be aware of
information indicating that such an act has occurred." Id. at 262. This standard
appears to set a level of certainty less demanding than "reasonably should believe."
168. In its Preliminary Report, the Cheek Commission recommended a "reasonably
should know" standard, Cheek Commission Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 208,
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lawyers' obligations to their corporate clients more in line with
standards that are worthy of a self-regulated profession."'
Economic analysis also supports our proposal. Economists might
suggest that an appropriate standard for measuring the propriety of
the lawyer's conduct is the standard that the parties themselves
would adopt if they were able to negotiate with each other.7 ° The
parties in interest in the example we use above are the company's
lawyers and its shareholders. We are hard pressed to muster a
convincing argument that shareholders in those circumstances would
agree to purchase such low quality legal work as is implicit in the
actual knowledge standard set by the Model Rules. Instead, we
believe it is likely that shareholders would demand and be willing to
pay the corporate lawyers to provide a quality of legal services that
at least is consistent with services offered by reasonably competent
attorneys in the marketplace.
In summary, we support an enhanced standard for lawyers
under Model Rule 1.13(b). A lawyer should be expected to take
remedial action within the corporation when she "reasonably should
believe" that managers are involved in misconduct rather than only
when she "knows" that this is occurring. We consider this a proper
expansion of a gatekeeping role for corporate lawyers in the post-
Enron world.
214, although it stated at another point in its Preliminary Report that "certainly the
lawyer is not expected to go over the head of the individual with whom the lawyer is
dealing unless he or she has reason to believe that the officer or employee is acting
illegally or fraudulently, or in breach of a duty to the corporation." Id., at 204
(emphasis added). In its Final Report, the Cheek Commission proposed an amendment
to Model Rule 1.13(b) obligating the lawyer for a corporation to take remedial steps if
he "knows facts from which a reasonable lawyer, under the circumstances, would
conclude" that a corporate manager is violating a legal obligation to the corporation.
Cheek Commission Final Report, supra note 9, at 44. The proposal of the Cheek
Commission, however, was rejected by the American Bar Association. See supra notes
151-52 and accompanying text.
169. The present subjective "knowing" standard can be seen by critics as an
example of the profession protecting its own members at the expense of their clients.
See discussion supra note 156. In economic terms, one might describe this in terms of
the profession assisting in the creation of a market failure in which the purchaser of
legal services is led to believe that lawyers are utilizing reasonable care on his or her
behalf, while the actual ethical standard requires much less of the lawyer.
170. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1445 (1989) (discussing the economic argument in favor of
corporate law that "fills in the blanks and oversights with the terms that people would
have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact
costlessly in advance"); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1982) ("Optimal fiduciary duties should approximate the
bargain that investors and mangers would reach if transaction costs were zero.").
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2. The Reach of the Duty to Act
Even if the "knowing" standard of Model Rule 1.13(b) were to be
changed as we recommend, the rule presents some troubling
restrictions on the lawyer's duty to respond to constituent
misconduct. These restrictions diminish what is expected of lawyers
in protecting the best interests of shareholders.
Under both the 1983 and 2003 versions of Model Rule 1.13(b), a
lawyer is to respond when he determines that a constituent "is
engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act" inappropriately in
regard to the corporation."' The duty of the lawyer to act remedially
is thus limited to instances of on-going or prospective constituent
misconduct.' Given the preventive nature of the remedial actions
suggested by Model Rule 1.13(b), this limitation makes some sense.
It is quite possible, however, that a lawyer for a corporation
might discover past misconduct by managers that constituted a
breach of their duty to the corporation or that was unlawful and
likely to result in substantial injury to the corporation. Furthermore,
this discovery could be made at a time when the impact of the
misconduct on the corporation could still be ameliorated. In such
situations, the entity's interests would be served by the lawyer
taking the sort of remedial actions called for in Model Rule 1.13(b).
To expect lawyers to do so when the effects of that past misconduct
could still be avoided or mitigated 7 ' would be a valuable expansion of
the lawyer's duty under that rule.'
171. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983).
172. See id.
173. In its August 2003 amendment of Model Rule 1.6, the ABA included exceptions
to the lawyer's duty of confidentiality in similar circumstances. The amended rule now
provides that a lawyer may reveal confidential information when the lawyer
reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the
client has used the lawyer's services. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3)
(2003). While this rule would also be applicable in the case of a lawyer representing a
corporate client, it pertains only to disclosures of confidential information outside of
the confines of the client. It does not affect the lawyer's duty take action within the
corporation to try to address the past misconduct. A similar provision is found in
Model Rule 5.3(c), which prescribes when supervising lawyers should be professionally
responsible for a subordinate lawyer's ethical violation. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.3(c). That rule provides that it is a violation for a supervising lawyer to
know of a subordinate lawyer's unethical conduct "at a time when its consequences can
be avoided or mitigated" and to fail "to take reasonable remedial action." Id. R.
5.3(c)(2).
Conceivably, Model Rule 1.13(b) could be amended to require lawyers to report all
serious past failings of managers to their superiors, regardless of the potential for
mitigation of that conduct. Such a requirement, however, would not be remedial in
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Another restriction on the duty to take remedial action under the
original and amended versions of Model Rule 1.13(b) is the vagueness
of the phrase "violation of law."7 ' This language raises the question
whether it should be read narrowly to include only statutory and
regulatory provisions of law or broadly to include common law
doctrine as well. 76 Given the natural pressures on lawyers to align
themselves with managers' interests, 77 it might be anticipated that
lawyers would tend to read the obligation narrowly. If lawyers are to
be expected to act in the best interests of shareholders, however,
response to "violations" of common law duties might be at least as
important as violations of statutory and regulatory provisions.'78 The
lawyer's intervention by the remedial steps stated in Model Rule
1.13(b) could prevent serious consequences to the interests of the
shareholders in these situations as well. Clearer guidance to lawyers
on the meaning of "violation of law," even in the comments to the
rule, would help assure that this is done.
One final concern with the 2003 version of Model Rule 1.13(b) is
the indeterminate nature of the lawyer's duty when her remedial
actions fail to arrest the manager's misconduct. In this situation, the
character and would have little to do with the protection of the interests of the
corporation or its shareholders that is sought by Model Rule 1.13(b).
174. Professor Gillers has made a similar recommendation. Gillers, supra note 54,
at 306.
175. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003).
176. The Cheek Commission appropriately reads the term broadly to include
common law in its Preliminary Report. Cheek Commission Preliminary Report, supra
note 9, at 197. Professor Wolfram seems to read "violation of law" broadly as well in
noting that "[a] law violation, such as the illegal manufacture of a defective product,
that threatens injury to nonclient third parties could still result in injury to the
organization because of the threat of suits." WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 744. There is
a similar issue as to the meaning of "illegal" in a proposal to amend Model Rule 1.2(d).
See infra text accompanying notes 218-24.
177. For a discussion of this phenomenon, the structural conflict, see supra Part
III.A.2.a.
178. Even the threat of expenses of litigation and the costs of adverse publicity
could render civil wrongs more damaging to a corporation than many statutory or
regulatory breaches. Lawyers' Manual, supra note 12, at 91:2406. A hypothetical fact
pattern presented in a popular professional responsibility casebook may offer some
insight. A transactional lawyer might, in the course of her representation of a
corporation, learn of a manager's determination that a dangerous product should be
produced and marketed despite the risk it presents to the corporation's financial
condition. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 288 (7th ed. 2000). This decision, however,
might not constitute a violation of the manager's duty to the corporation or a violation
of a statutory or regulatory provision. Nevertheless, the decision might present a
"violation" of the law of products liability and expose the corporation to substantial
liability. Professor Wolfram makes the point with a similar example. See supra text
accompanying note 176.
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newly amended Model Rule 1.13(c) permits the lawyer to reveal
confidential information when the misconduct "is clearly a violation
of law, and... reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to
the organization."' 9 A lawyer could also choose to withdraw from the
representation of the corporate client under these circumstances. 80
Given this discretion, the lawyer may choose not to make any
disclosure outside of the client's confines and to continue to represent
the corporation for a range of practical' and even professional
reasons,182 and this may present no further difficulty for the lawyer in
many situations. What is the lawyer to do, however, if she is asked to
further the very transaction that caused her to take the unsuccessful
remedial action under Model Rule 1.13(b)? The guidance offered to
the lawyer by the Model Rules in this situation is diffuse'83 and,
therefore, unclear. The rule should be amended to declare that the
lawyer choosing to continue in the representation under these
circumstances must avoid assisting in any transaction that embodies
or furthers the manager's troubling action.
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2003).
180. Id. R. 1.16(b)(2); 1.16(b)(4).
181. Most obviously, the lawyer may not wish to suffer the personal financial loss
that withdrawal would likely impose. This would be true in the case of outside counsel
and in-house counsel as well.
182. The lawyer may correctly conclude that the best interests of the client would
not be served by withdrawal. The change of legal counsel could impose significant costs
on the client.
183. Certainly the lawyer would have to refuse to assist the transaction if the
lawyer knows it to be criminal or fraudulent under Model Rule 1.2(d), which directs
lawyers not to "counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
For further discussion of this prohibition, see supra text accompanying notes 73-80,
and infra text accompanying 'notes 185-201. Furthermore, if the lawyer knows that the
transaction would otherwise be a violation of law, Model Rule 1. 16(a)(1) requires her to
withdraw if the client insists on her participation after consulting with the client
regarding the illegality. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2003).
What may be less clear, however, is what the lawyer should do when she has
complained about a manager's action that she perceives to be a breach of his duty to
the corporation, her remedial action has failed to have that action overturned, she has
chosen not to blow the whistle by revealing confidential information under Model Rule
1.6(b)(3), and she is then asked to lend assistance to the troubling transaction.
Only the amalgam of rules that constitute the lawyer's duty to serve the best
interests of her client provide guidance here. See supra note 81 and accompanying text
which discuss these rules. In addition, the lawyer must fear civil liability for aiding the
constituent in his violation of his fiduciary duties to the corporation. For further
discussion of this limit on lawyers, see supra note 34. Under a complete analysis of the
restrictions presented by these limitations, therefore, the careful lawyer will refuse to
participate in the transaction. Still, the lawyer is not offered guidance by the 2003
amendment's version of Model Rule 1.13(b) and (c) on this important issue. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b), 1.13(c) (2003).
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Lawyers for corporations who confront the troubling
circumstances of constituent misconduct would be aided by
clarification of these issues pertaining to the reach of their duties
under Model Rule 1.13(b).'84 The gatekeeper role of lawyers would be
strengthened by addressing these shortcomings as well.
C. Limits on Lawyers Furthering Clients' Wrongdoing
The ethical obligation of a lawyer to pursue the best interests of
a corporate client, as reflected in the best interests of its
shareholders, remains constrained by the outer limit imposed by
Model Rule 1.2(d).'85 Under that rule a transactional lawyer
representing a corporation cannot assist a client in conduct that the
lawyer "knows" is "criminal or fraudulent" 8' even if it produces
results beneficial to the corporation's shareholders.'87 When the rule
is considered as a component of the lawyer's role as gatekeeper,
however, both the "knowing" standard of Model Rule 1.2(d) and its
reach only to a limited range of unlawful conduct are problematic.
In clear situations of managerial wrongdoing that a corporate
lawyer may confront the rule's standard presents no difficulties.
Consider an example in which a manager seeks the lawyer's help in
filing a tax return that materially understates the company's income.
To make the point, we can assume further that the resulting savings
will be of certain benefit to the company's shareholders and that
there is no chance that the corporation's violation will be discovered.
184. The Preliminary Report of the Cheek Commission points to other
characteristics of the widely-adopted 1983 version of Model Rule 1.13(b) that tend to
discourage lawyers from taking remedial action to protect the interests of corporate
clients. Cheek Commission Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 203-04. These include
the provision's requirement that an agent's misconduct be "related to the
representation" in order for the duty to arise. Id. at 203. Also, the emphasis on the
duty to minimize disruption to the corporation is seen as misplaced. Id. at 203-04. The
Cheek Commission also sees the Comment's preference for "clear justification" before
going over the head of a manager as discouraging the lawyer's remedial action. Id. at
204. Finally, that group believes that the rule should make clear that the lawyer does
not have to follow the remedial measures sequentially. Id. at 204.
185. For a discussion of this obligation of lawyers, see supra text accompanying
notes 73-80.
186. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003) (forbidding a lawyer to
"counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent").
187. This limitation is particularly salient for the corporate lawyer who chooses not
to withdraw after exhausting the remedial measures called for in Model Rule 1.13(b).
What is she to do when corporate managers expect her to assist in the very transaction
that caused her concern? She is permitted by Model Rule 1.13 to continue in the
representation, but that rule does not instruct the lawyer on what course to take in
furthering the client's inappropriate conduct. Id. R. 1.13. Model Rule 1.2(d) offers the
only, but not definitive, help. For a discussion of this anomaly, see supra note 183.
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Even so, if the company's lawyer is aware of the material
understatement, Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits the lawyer from lending
assistance to this fraudulent and criminal action by the client despite
its economic benefit to the shareholders.8 No competent and ethical
lawyer would think otherwise.
Most applications of Model Rule 1.2(d), however, present more
troubling issues of application and greater temptation for the lawyer.
Usually, the potentially criminal conduct proposed by the corporate
client is less blatant and morally repugnant than tax fraud,'89
rendering the boundaries of the rule's prohibition more subtle.19 ° For
example, managers of a corporate client may propose selling
securities without registration, relying on the intrastate exemption
provided by Rule 147.1" While a competent lawyer would be aware
that a misapplication of that exemption could constitute a crime,19
the proposed action is likely to cause her less immediate
consternation than would a client's proposed tax fraud. Additionally,
the application of Model Rule 1.2(d) to the sale of the unregistered
securities raises yet again the elusive issue of what the lawyer
"knows"1 93 about her client's conduct, and the structural alliance with
managers... provides incentive for the lawyer to resist concluding
that she has such certainty.
Because Model Rule 1.2(d) purports to restrict lawyers in
furthering the worst kinds of their clients' conduct, the "knowing"
standard is too permissive in any sort of legal representation. 9' The
188. Advising clients on questionable tax issues presents a range of difficult issues.
WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 700-01, 709-10. The client's known fraud in understating
the corporation's income, however, is not among them. See id. at 700-01, 709-10.
189. Not all matters of tax advice, however, involve the clear illegality assumed in
the hypothetical intentional understatement of income. Id. at 700.
190. Professor Wolfram notes the difficulty the lawyer faces when the law is not
clear and the client would like to be aggressive in approaching the issue. He states
that "[i]t would be improbable that a lawyer could perform the lawyerly function of
advice-giving in such a situation in the same way in which a lawyer advises on legally
and morally unquestionable transactions." Id. at 692.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 147 (2003) (exempting from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933 offers and sales of securities to persons who are residents of the
same state in which the issuer is incorporated and doing business).
192. A "wilful" violation of the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 carries a
penalty of a fine of up to $10,000 or a jail term of up to "five years, or both." 15 U.S.C. §
77x (2000).
193. The standard of the lawyer's "knowledge" was discussed above in reference to
the lawyer's duty to take remedial action under Model Rule 1.13(b). See supra text
accompanying notes 147-74. For a discussion on Professor Hazard's view of what a
lawyer "knows" in reference to the term's use in Model Rule 1.13(b), see supra note
162.
194. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.a.
195. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
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standard tends to encourage all lawyers to discount their suspicions
and concerns regarding the criminality or fraudulent character of
their clients' conduct, largely freeing them to assist that conduct
through their provision of professional services except in the face of
glaring impropriety. The only possible justification for such broad
leeway is as a means of furthering the interests of clients even in the
most questionable of circumstances. 196
In many instances involving corporate representations, however,
the "knowing" standard of Model Rule 1.2(d) cannot even be
characterized as being "pro-client," at least if we keep clearly in mind
that the interests of the corporate client are generally to be equated
with those of the shareholders. When a corporate lawyer is asked by
a manager to assist in a transaction the lawyer believes constitutes a
crime or fraud, resolving doubts in favor of furthering the manager's
proposed conduct may well serve the manager's interests, but it
provides insufficient protection to the best interests of those
shareholders and, therefore, to the corporate client itself. When
coupled with the structural pressures to favor managers' interests,
the "knowing" standard of Model Rule 1.2(d) tends to dissuade
lawyers from resisting managerial misconduct, the very sort of
professional concern that arises from the Enron experience. For the
corporate lawyer, proper concern for the interests of shareholders
often demands refusal to assist transactions even when the lawyer's
level of certainty does not reach a state of "knowing" that the conduct
is criminal or fraudulent.
Given the broad application of Model Rule 1.2(d) to all types of
legal representation, we must be mindful that, unlike Model Rule
1.13(b), the limitation on lawyers that it presents does more than
serve the interests of shareholders in the corporate context; it also
serves as a significant limitation on the loyalty of all lawyers to their
clients and on their clients' ability to establish their own objectives
for legal representations. Still, while all might agree that a lawyer
should be encouraged to be loyal to her clients and deferential to
their objectives, when a reasonable lawyer would decide that a
client's proposed course of conduct is unlawful, she should be
expected to withhold her professional assistance. If not, it is hard to
imagine in what sense lawyers are truly to be viewed as "officer[s] of
the legal system."'97
We maintain that lawyers should be prohibited from assisting
their clients' conduct when they "reasonably should believe""' that
196. Cheek Commission Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 208.
197. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 1 (2003).
198. This is the same scienter standard we propose for the duty of corporate lawyers
to take remedial action under Model Rule 1.13(b). For a discussion of this standard,
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the conduct is illegal.'99 This objective standard would allow lawyers
and their clients the necessary discretion to pursue objectives when
reasonable lawyers would disagree as to the law's application or the
client's purpose, thus preserving clients' ability to take legitimate
risks as to the application of the law. Furthermore, it is imperative
that Model Rule 1.2(d) continue to exempt good faith efforts to test
the validity of the law,"'° something that may require conduct that is
known to be clearly illegal. In other situations, however, when
reasonable lawyers would suppose the client's conduct to be illegal, a
lawyer should not assist the, client's conduct."' With our proposed
standard in place, lawyers would be expected to be more cautious in
providing legal assistance to their clients' unlawful objectives,
see supra text accompanying notes 165-69. As to the limitation in Model Rule 1.2(d),
the Preliminary Report of the Cheek Commission recommends a "reasonably should
know" standard. Cheek Commission Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 214. This is
similar to its proposal to amend the "knowing" standard of Model Rule 1.13(b). Id. at
207-08; see also discussion supra note 168. The Cheek Commission's Final Report,
however, made no recommendation to amend Model Rule 1.2(d), choosing to focus on
"facilitating the flow of information and analysis concerning legal compliance issues
within the organizations" and "the limitations on the ability of the lawyer to disclose to
third parties information concerning criminal or fraudulent conduct by the client."
Cheek Commission Final Report, supra note 9, at 34. Thus, its recommendations on
amendments to the Model Rules are limited to Model Rule 1.13 on the representation
of organizations and Model Rule 1.6 on confidentiality. Id. at 34-35. Professor Cramton
also urges adoption of the "reasonably should know" standard for Model Rule 1.2(d).
Cramton, supra note 15, at 185. We contend, however, that this standard still
demands too high a level of certainty before the lawyer faces the limit of the rule. The
question we would ask is whether a lawyer should be justified in counseling or
assisting a client in conduct that a reasonable lawyer would suppose is unlawful. That
is, in deciding between our proposed standard and that of the Preliminary Report of
the Cheek Commission and Professor Cramton, should an officer of the legal system be
able to avoid professional sanction by asserting that, while a reasonable lawyer would
have supposed the client's conduct to be unlawful, a reasonable lawyer would not have
been certain?
199. See infra text accompanying notes 218-23 for a discussion on the issue of what
is meant by "illegal."
200. The present rule provides that a lawyer may "counsel or assist a client to make
a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
201. This approach would bring the duty of lawyers under professional standards
more in line with their duty to avoid assisting inappropriate conduct under the law of
agency and criminal law. Professor Hazard notes that agency law's concept of
"privilege" will protect a lawyer from liability only if the lawyer has a reasonable belief
as to facts supporting the propriety of the client's action. Hazard, supra note 34, at
677, 678, 681. He further notes that "complicity" under criminal law turns on a similar
standard. Id. at 682 ("As to the extent of knowledge that will result in complicity, the
cases say not only that liability results from actual knowledge of the client's illegal
purpose, but also that it results from knowledge of facts that reasonably should excite
suspicion.").
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thereby reducing the likelihood of the clients engaging in anticipated
misconduct in a broader range of circumstances.
The present limitation of Model Rule 1.2(d) is also too restrained
in its prohibition of lawyer assistance only to client conduct that is
"criminal or fraudulent."2" The issue is not new, having been debated
in the course of the adoption of the Model Rules in 1983.203 Under the
counterpart to Model Rule 1.2(d) contained in the prior Code of
Professional Responsibility,"4 a lawyer was not to assist a client's
fraud or conduct the lawyer knew to be "illegal", a term reaching
beyond the criminal law."5 Even under that standard, some scholars
questioned whether lawyers ought to be permitted to assist in
transactions involving unconscionable terms that favored their
clients.0 6 Earlier proposed versions of the Model Rule provision also
took a broader view of conduct that was unworthy of lawyer
assistance. The original proposal from the Kutak Commission
prohibited a lawyer from giving "advice which the lawyer can
reasonably foresee will.., be used by the client to further an illegal
course of conduct.2 7 A later proposal proscribed a lawyer's assistance
in preparing written instruments with "legally prohibited terms."2°8
Model Rule 1.2(d) as adopted by the ABA, however, constitutes a
substantial retreat from the broad prohibition in the Code and from
the Kutak Commission proposals in forbidding a lawyer's assistance
only when the client's conduct is known to be a crime or fraud."9
To illustrate the limitation of the current rule, consider the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act's provision that requires a
corporation to provide a shareholders' list to any of its shareholders
202. Professor Wolfram asserts that the Model Rules, including Model Rule 1.2(d),
"do not limit a lawyer's advice, even encouragement, to a client about unlawful acts so
long as the acts are not criminal or fraudulent." WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 704.
203. See id. at 704-05.
204. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1981). See generally
Hazard, supra note 34, for a helpful discussion of the reaches of the limitation on
lawyers imposed by DR 7-102(A)(7).
205. See WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 694.
206. See Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L.
REV. 577, 591 (1975) (stating that a "lawyer cannot ethically accept an arrangement
that is completely unfair to the other side"); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism
and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 685-86 (1978) (proposing a
"Professional Rule for the Nonadvocate").
207. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1583 n.75 (1995) (quoting
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a) (Discussion Draft 1980)).
208. WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 705 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
4.3 (Discussion Draft 1980)).
209. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983). Professor Wolfram
concludes that this was the intended result of the ABA. WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at
704-05.
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under certain conditions. 1 Failure on the part of the corporation to
accede to such a clearly lawful request, however, carries no criminal
penalty. 1 In fact, the only "penalty" imposed on a corporation
improperly failing to turn over the list to the requesting shareholder
is that the corporation may have to pay the expenses if the
shareholder goes to court for an order requiring inspection. 12 Under
Model Rule 1.2(d) presently, a lawyer for the corporation that, in the
heat of a battle for corporate control, receives a legitimate request for
a shareholders list from the insurgent can feel free to advise the
corporate client to refuse to provide the list, even though it is clear
that such conduct is in violation of the statute. This is because such a
refusal is not "criminal or fraudulent."12
Such an outcome is impossible to justify. By the action of its duly
elected representatives, society has spoken through this statute to
define a legal duty despite the lack of a criminal sanction. If the
profession is serious about its members' role as officers of the legal
system, lawyers should not be permitted to facilitate the flouting of
articulated legal standards. Instead, the restraint imposed by Model
Rule 1.2(d) should be broadened beyond client crimes and fraud.
In response to the Enron outrages and other corporate scandals,
some prominent authorities have urged greater responsibilities for
lawyers to serve the public interest in the representation of their
clients.214 One way to implement such sentiments would be to expand
the reach of Model Rule 1.2(d) to prohibit lawyer assistance to
transactions that fail to serve the interests of the public.
Although the Enron experience suggests that expansion of the
prohibition in Model Rule 1.2(d) is necessary, a standard defined by
the "public interest" is unwise. Such a standard would be nearly
impossible for lawyers and tribunals to apply given the variety of
views on what constitutes the "public interest."' 5 While lawyers
210. Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 16.02(b)(3), (c) (2002).
211. Id. §§ 16.01-16.06.
212. Id. § 16.04(c).
213. The refusal could, however, be viewed as a breach of management's legal
obligation to the corporation requiring remedial action by the lawyer knowing of it. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1. 13(b) (1983).
214. For example, Harvey Pitt, then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, declared in the wake of Enron that "it is inappropriate for corporate
lawyers to... disserve the public interest, even if those results can be achieved in a
manner arguably within the literal letter of the laws." This Week's Highlights, No.
2014, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 (Feb. 27, 2002) (emphasis added). Chairman Pitt
further stated that "all upon whom the present system depends [should) adopt a bias
in favor of the needs of the investing public." Id. (emphasis added).
215. Consider, for example, a request by a client that a lawyer lend assistance to the
acquisition and ultimate clear cutting of a stand of timber, which, we assume for our
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ought to be, and are, free to refuse to assist in transactions because of
their views of the public interest,"6 a duty to do so would be another
matter. This is particularly true in the vast range of activities for
which no societal affirmation of policy has been achieved by
legislative, rule-making, or judicial bodies.2"7 Indeed, given the
structural pressures working on them, it would not be surprising to
find that corporate lawyers' view of the public interest in these
situations is aligned nicely with the interests of managers. While it
could be argued that the adoption of a public interest standard in
Model Rule 1.2(d) would serve as a strong pronouncement by the
organized bar of lawyers' important public interest role, unless it
affected the way lawyers act, it would likely be another source of
public dissatisfaction with the profession and of cynicism within it.
While a public interest standard does not present a promising
alternative for defining the reach of the restriction imposed on
lawyers' actions by Model Rule 1.2(d), the reach of the rule's
prohibition only to client conduct that is criminal or fraudulent
demands reform. We believe that the prohibition should be expanded
to include any client conduct that would be generally characterized
as "illegal." This "reform" would merely constitute a return to the
standard embraced by the profession prior to the adoption of the
purposes here, is legal. Many in society may consider such an act to be contrary to the
best interests of society, and, indeed, some may consider this entirely legal act to be
immoral. Under a public interest standard, it would be difficult for the lawyer, and
ultimately a tribunal, to determine whether the lawyer would violate an obligation to
promote the "public interest" if the lawyer participated in this legal transaction.
216. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (4) (2003) (permitting a lawyer to
withdraw from the representation of a client if the client "insists upon taking action
that the lawyer considers repugnant"). Furthermore, lawyers are required to provide
their clients with "candid advice," which is not required to be limited to purely legal
considerations but may also include "moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
2.1(2003).
217. Measuring appropriate lawyer conduct by a "public interest" standard is
further complicated by the different risk-reward structures faced by the transactional
lawyer, on the one hand, and her client, on the other. Reconsider our clear cutting
example, supra note 215. On the reward side, we assume that the client stands to
make a lot of money from a successful clear cutting of the land, while the lawyer will
receive a more modest reward of her hourly rate for her legal work. On the risk side,
we are assuming that clear cutting is not a crime or illegal. Thus, the client's only risk
is the business risk that is present in all business transactions and, perhaps, some
personal reputational damage among persons who consider clear cutting bad. The
lawyer, however, risks significant professional damage, including disbarment and
professional reputation damage, if it is determined that clear cutting is not in the
public interest. In such a case, lawyers may thus have an incentive to err on the side of
a broad interpretation of the "public interest," while the client's interests would favor a
narrow interpretation of that concept.
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Model Rules.218 As noted above,219 the term was used in the Code of
Professional Responsibility's counterpart to Model Rule 1.2(d)20 and
was generally regarded as reaching beyond the criminal law.221
Our proposed use of the term "unlawful" is intended to convey
the same broad reach. Certainly we believe it is imperative that the
prohibition contained in Model Rule 1.2(d) be expanded to reach all
client conduct that would violate a statute or regulation, whether or
not that conduct is considered criminal, given that these enactments
are the clearest legal pronouncements of societal norms. We also
believe that the rule's restriction on lawyer assistance should reach
intentional client conduct that violates common law duties as well.2
While the source of such duties is the judicial system, the legal and
societal standards embodied in the common law are no less
compelling than those that are legislative in nature. Exceptions for
breach of contract and invasions of property interests would be
necessary,"' since such breaches of duty are often viewed as mere
economic choices rather than failures to comply with legal norms.224
Even under this proposal, clients may choose to act contrary to
defined legal standards, but at least they will not be as likely to have
the assistance of their lawyers in doing so.
218. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1981).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 204-05.
220. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7).
221. WOLFRAM, supra note 33, at 694.
222. Indeed, Professor Hazard reads "illegal" in the Code prohibition to include
criminal violations, regulatory offenses, and intentional conduct resulting in civil
liability other than contract breaches and invasions of property interests. Hazard,
supra note 34, at 672-75. He concludes that a lawyer violates her duty under the
Code's DR 7-102(A)(7) "to refrain from 'assisting' a client['s]" illegal conduct when:
(1) The client is engaged in a course of conduct that violates the criminal law
or is an intentional violation of a civil obligation, other than failure to
perform a contract or failure to sustain a good faith claim to property;
(2) The lawyer has knowledge of the facts sufficient to reasonably discern
that the client's course of conduct is such a violation; and
(3) The lawyer facilitates the client's course of conduct either by giving
advice that encourages the client to pursue the conduct or indicates how to
reduce the risks of detection, or by performing an act that substantially
furthers the course of conduct.
Id. at 682-83.
223. Id. at 675 ("The term 'illegality' in ordinary legal parlance does not embrace
breach of contract or invasion of a property interest.").
224. As Professor Hazard also notes, however, "there are breaches of contract and
invasions of personal and property interests that are more flagrant and more harmful
than many torts, and indeed more harmful that many regulatory offenses." Id. Still,
we believe the exception for such conduct provides a reasonable balance for permitting
generally accepted economic decision-making relevant to contract performance and
property rights.
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Our proposal to change the "knowing" standard and to broaden
the reach of the illegality covered by Model Rule 1.2(d) would reduce
the rule's present lenience toward lawyers' participation in their
clients' unlawful activities. In corporate representations, where
clients act through transactions generally requiring the assistance of
lawyers, the change should have particular importance in reducing
the likelihood of client misconduct. More broadly, the change would
bring the reality of the expectations of lawyers embodied in the
Model Rules more in line with the bar's self-professed role as officers
of the legal system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Enron debacle serves as a tragic reminder that corporate
managers can engage in misconduct that has far-reaching, disastrous
consequences for shareholders, employees, creditors, and others.
Because that misconduct can be implemented through corporate
transactions, lawyers who provide legal services in accomplishing
those transactions often play the role of gatekeepers for their
corporate clients' conduct. Unfortunately, an analysis of the present
gatekeeper role of lawyers as embodied in the prevailing rules of
professional ethics reveals that it offers too little protection to the
interests of the corporate client and, therefore, to other interests as
well. We propose several reforms to invigorate lawyers' gatekeeper
role in representing corporations.
First, we believe that Model Rule 1.13(a)'s use of the entity
theory can lead the lawyer to adopt a vague, intuitive sense of the
identity of the corporate client. This approach offers little help in
assessing the propriety of certain managerial decisions. To counter
this deficiency, the rules of professional ethics should reflect directly
that it is the substantive law of corporations that determines to
which of the various constituencies the managers, and therefore the
corporation's lawyers, owe their primary duty. Thus, lawyers should
be made aware that the conception of the entity must be informed by
the law of corporations. This could be accomplished by a declaration
to that effect in the comments to Model Rule 1.13. Although
corporate lawyers are to give wide deference to the business decisions
of managers, they must act when those decisions would violate the
managers' duty to the corporation. With additional guidance from the
comments to the rules, lawyers would thus be guided by the interests
of shareholders in determining whether a manager's action violates a
duty to the corporate entity.
Second, we believe that the scienter standard applicable to
lawyers under Model Rule 1.13(b), even after the 2003 amendments,
fails to protect the interests of corporate clients. Under that rule, a
lawyer is required to take remedial actions only when she "knows"
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that managers are engaged in misconduct."5 We conclude that
lawyers should be expected to take that action when they "reasonably
should believe" that managers are doing so and that Model Rule
1.13(b) should be so amended.
Third, we believe that the obligation of lawyers to act to protect
the best interests of corporate clients is too narrow in several other
respects. Currently neither the 1983 nor the 2003 versions of Model
Rule 1.13(b) requires lawyers to take any remedial action when past
managerial misconduct is discovered. We propose that the rule be
amended to require such action when the effects of the past
misconduct can still be avoided or mitigated. Model Rule 1.13(b)
would also be improved by a notation in the comments that "violation
of law" is to be read broadly to include common law duties as well as
other legal requirements. We also propose that if lawyers choose to
continue in the representation of corporate clients after their
remedial actions have failed to arrest managers' misconduct, they
should be aware that they must avoid assisting in any transaction
that embodies or furthers the managers' troubling action. This could
be accomplished by amendment of Model Rule 1.13(c) to that effect or
by clarification in the comments.
Fourth, as an important final limit on the lawyer's duty to act on
behalf of the best interests of a client, Model Rule 1.2(d) is
inadequate. By prohibiting a lawyer's assistance only when he
"knows" of his client's wrongdoing, Model Rule 1.2(d)'s effectiveness
as a meaningful professional limit is hampered. We propose that this
standard be replaced with a "reasonably should believe" standard by
amendment of the rule. The limitation of Model Rule 1.2(d)'s
prohibition only to a client's "criminal or fraudulent" conduct is also
too lenient. We propose that the rule be amended to prohibit a
lawyer's assistance to any "illegal" conduct and that the comments
make clear that this includes common law duties as well. These
changes will make Model Rule 1.2(d) a more meaningful part of the
lawyer's duty as an officer of the legal system in all sorts of
representations. In corporate representations, the amended rule
would also constitute-an important component of the lawyer's role as
gatekeeper.
Finally, we believe that corporate lawyers' natural allegiance to
the managers who hire, compensate, and supervise them, constitutes
a significant barrier to the professional independence required in the
role of gatekeeper. These allegiances create a structural conflict for
the corporate lawyer in serving the interests of the corporation as
embodied in the interests of shareholders. To reduce this conflict, we
propose that as a matter of corporate governance, lawyers for a
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corporation should be selected, compensated, and supervised by
independent audit committees. Such committees constitute the best
available alternative in terms of representing the interests of
shareholders. This requirement could be accomplished by
corporations' own actions, by statutory amendment, by regulatory
action, or through stock exchange rules.
We believe that the changes we propose will inflate the role of
corporate transactional lawyers as gatekeepers of their clients'
conduct beyond its present state in the rules of professional conduct.
Ultimately, however, this role will only be fulfilled by the
commitment of lawyers to serve their corporate clients faithfully by
providing the sort of independence in judgment and action those
clients, the profession, and society should expect. Enron should have
taught those of us in the profession that lawyers, among others, can
do more to reduce the likelihood of similar future tragedies.
